


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About the Authors

DANIEL J. BOORSTIN served as director of the National Museum of History and Technology from 1969-73 and as senior historian for the Smithsonian Institution from 1973-75. Since 1975, he has served as The Librarian of Congress, a presidential appointment. He is the author of many publications including: *The Americans—The Colonial Experience*, winner of the Bancroft Prize; *The National Experience*, winner of the Parkman Prize; and *The Democratic Experience*, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for history and the Dexter Prize.

ROBERT E. CRAIG is assistant professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire. A graduate of Adelphi University, he holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of North Carolina.

JEROME JAFFRE is the director of political studies at SOFRES, a leading institute of polling in France. He has published many articles, notably in the *Revue française de Science Politique* and *Projet et Pouvoirs*. He directed *l'Opinion Française en 1977*, published by the National Foundation of Political Science.

PAUL JOHNSON, historian, journalist and broadcaster, is widely noted for both his writings and his intellectual odyssey. From 1965 to 1970, he was editor of *The New Statesman*, an influential British weekly of the left. Thereafter his views became increasingly conservative, and in 1977, he wrote a political testament, *Enemies of Society*, that was a scathing denunciation of "the fascist left." The book was an instant source of controversy in Britain and, to a lesser extent, in other nations. Between 1970 and 1977, Johnson wrote steadily, including several works that

revealed his deep interest in religion and history. Among his books are: *The Offshore Islanders* (1972); *Elizabeth I* (1974), and *A History of Christianity* (1976). Johnson now lives in London and is preparing a history of the modern world.

WERNER KALTEFLEITER is a professor of political science and director of the seminar for science and history of politics at the University of Kiel, West Germany. From 1968-69 he was a research fellow at Harvard University. From 1970-75 he was director of the Social Science Research Institute of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Dr. Kaltefleiter was made vice president of the University of Kiel in 1975.

FUJI KAMIYA is a professor of international relations at Keio University and the author of many books on U.S.-Japanese relations, on international relations, and on Korea. He is currently a visiting professor at the East Asian Institute at Columbia University. He holds an LL.B. from Tokyo University and an LL.D. from Kyoto University.

DAVID W. MOORE is an associate professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Dr. Moore did his graduate work at Ohio State University. He has published a number of articles in political science journals and has conducted numerous political polls in the state of New Hampshire.

MICHAEL JAY ROBINSON is associate professor of politics at Catholic University in Washington, D.C. He frequently writes about television and American politics. His study, *Public Affairs: Television and the Growth of Political Malaise*, won the 1973 American Political Science Association award for best dissertation in American politics, and some of his more recent works have appeared in *Public Interest* and the *Woodrow Wilson Quarterly*.

RICHARD ROSE is director of the Center for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, and secretary of the International Committee on Political Sociology, a worldwide network of election experts. He has co-authored the *International Almanac of Electoral History* and edited *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook*, covering countries from Finland to Australia. He is also the author of *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* (with Guy Peters) and *What is Governing: Purpose and Policy in Washington*. Mr. Rose also writes about parties and elections for the *London Times*, the *Telegraph* and British television networks.

ROBERT M. WORCESTER is chairman and managing director of Market & Opinion Research International (MORI), a company he founded in London in 1969. An American, he conducts the polls for the *London Sunday Times* and the *Daily Express* and has for the past three British general elections polled for the Labour party. He is the author of numerous articles on survey research as well as the editor of the *Consumer Market Research Handbook*.

HANS ZETTERBERG is the executive director of SIFO, the Swedish Institution of Opinion Research, a position he has held since 1975. He is the author of a number of books and articles and has consulted widely with corporations, foundations, museums, and international organizations. From 1969-73, he was director of Social Surveys Ltd. (Gallup Poll).

Publisher

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Conversations with Paul

In early March, a noted British historian and commentator, Paul Johnson, visited the American Enterprise Institute for two days of conversation sponsored by Public Opinion magazine. The central topic of discussion was a question posed by editors of the magazine: Is the American Century Ending? Printed here are excerpts from those discussions with Mr. Johnson.

For a different perspective, please see the following article which contains the views of Dr. Daniel Boorstin, an eminent American historian who now serves as The Librarian of Congress. Dr. Boorstin's comments were recorded during a conversation with Mr. Johnson at AEI during the Johnson visit.

Ben Wattenberg: *Rather suddenly, foreign policy has moved to the forefront of the American consciousness. Events in Iran, Afghanistan, in Africa and Southeast Asia have tumbled upon us, one over the other, and there is a sense that events are moving against us and in a way over which we have little control.*

This issue of Public Opinion shows survey research indicating that Americans think we are getting relatively weaker in the world arena. The research all begs a larger question that to many of us seems to be at the root of this situation, and it is this: Is the American Century Ending?

Our questions to you, Paul Johnson, are these:

Are there, indeed, such things as dominant societies that are worthy of owning a century or an era? What is their nature and do they rise and fall?

Second, has the United States been one of these dominant societies? How did we become one? Are we still such a society?

Third, has this been good for us? Has it been good for the rest of the world?

Fourth, insofar as this has been an American moment in history, is it, indeed, ending?

Fifth, and finally, if it is happening, is it reversible and is it worth the fight?

Paul Johnson: To address your first question, I think there is no doubt that there are dominant societies, though not necessarily all the time. One can take instances.

In the fifth century B.C., Athens and the states allied with it were dominant—militarily, economically, and above all, culturally because they were supplying something which the world wanted and which nobody else could supply.

Equally, you can say that empires are dominant, in the sense that the Roman Empire was completely dominant between about 100 B.C. and 200-250 A.D. You can also say that between the 1650s or 1660s and 1700, France was the dominant power in Europe, dominant not only in the military sense but also in the cultural sense, in that the prevailing

ideas of society came mostly from France.

Between 1815 and about the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain was dominant as the collapse of French power opened up a huge vacuum which was, to some extent, filled by the Royal Navy. At the same time that Britain was exporting the patents, the skilled manpower, and the capital of the industrial revolution, its navy was acting as an international policeman. So, there again was another dominant period.

And I think it is true to say that between 1945 and the early 1970s, there was a period of American dominance, characterized by America as the great reserve military power in the West—that is to say, the power to which, when all else failed, everybody had to turn in order to sustain themselves. America was also the great reserve economic power in that, through the Marshall Plan and so forth, it was able to operate a series of pump-priming operations which restructured and rebuilt the world economy.

During that same period, America had a tremendous and pervasive cultural influence. American attitudes—the notion of plenty; the notion of mass production being a common legacy; the notion that if you worked hard enough you could, in the end, get what you wanted; the general optimistic expansionism based upon industrial mass production—were the keynote of the world.

Century Ending?

Johnson & Daniel Boorstin

The 1970s, however, brought both a contraction of American power, as a result of the harrowing experience in Vietnam, and also a contraction of the American vision, because for the first time in thirty years there was very serious worldwide recession. For the first time in a whole generation, people began to doubt, "Well, is the American dream of a world of plenty actually going to come true?"

So one has a period then of twenty-five to thirty years of American cultural-economic-military dominance, followed by what we are living through at the moment, a period of doubt and questioning which is going on all over the world.

Wattenberg: *At that moment when this country was such a dominant society, was that of great benefit to the man on the street or are these things that just concern intellectuals?*


Johnson: This is always one of the great questions: Does it benefit the ordinary man-in-the-street to be part of the dominant power and a great empire? That is something, I dare say, that the people in fifth century Greece asked themselves as did people in the first century A.D., Rome. Certainly, one could argue that the great British Empire was administered from a country where there was ferocious poverty, and it is not always easy to see how that imperial wealth ac-

tually benefitted the ordinary people.

But I would say that in the case of the American period of dominance, it is much easier to demonstrate that the "American Century" actually benefitted ordinary American citizens because in those early postwar years, America as well as Western Europe and Japan and other countries was able to enjoy a period of unprecedented prosperity. America was the dynamic force helping to create it, but also shared in it as much as anyone else.


There is a second part to the question, and that is whether people outside the United States found, on the whole, that the American influence was beneficial for them. And I would say yes, because, after all, what did they obtain during that period? They shared in this huge prosperity. For the first time in history, the notion of plenty became a realizable ideal for ordinary people. This is a fundamental economic change. Moreover, they did enjoy security. In the Eisenhower-Kennedy years, and to some extent the LBJ and Nixon years, people in the West felt that although they lived in a dangerous world, it was a world in which there was one beneficent superpower which, if worse came to worst, would be able to talk from a language of strength and would maintain the balance of terror.

It is more arguable whether the influence of American culture—to sum it up crudely, the sort of Coca Cola culture—



"Between 1945 and the early 1970s, there was a period of American dominance . . . that, on the whole, was beneficial. . . . The 1970s, however, brought both a contraction of American power . . . and of the American vision. . . ."

Johnson



"America has been very courageous over the past thirty years in accepting its responsibilities. It must be equally courageous . . . and hardboiled in recovering from its mistakes. . . . America has to make a tremendous act of will."

Johnson

was beneficent. Personally, I believe that people best express their real values when they are voting either with their feet or with their pocketbooks, and by all those criteria, American culture is an acceptable phenomenon and a likable phenomenon for the great majority of people who have actually been given the opportunity to sample it. American culture may not please the intellectuals, it may not please the traditionalists, but the great majority of ordinary, common garden people happen to like it.

Taking Up the Burden

David Gergen: *Why did the Americans become the dominant force in the post-war period?*

Johnson: I think it was inevitable and, indeed, to some extent, it had been adumbrated since 1918. The 1914-1918 war ended the concert of powers, the old traditional balance of power in Europe, and it ended the dominant age of European supremacy. After 1918, the European empires were broken up, and European security had to be administered by the "walking wounded," namely Britain and France. Both Britain and France emerged from that war theoretically intact as empires, but in fact grievously weakened—weakened not merely in material things but also in spirit because of the colossal loss of wealth and still more colossal loss of life which both of them had undergone.

America then retreated back to the other side of the Atlantic, leaving Europe to be run by these "walking wounded," and we were manifestly incapable of doing it; there followed the rise of Hitler and the Second World War.

In 1945, therefore, it was incumbent upon America to take over the role as the general administrator of the Western world, the ultimate peacekeeper, judge, and administrator of it. Happily, America then rose and accepted that burden and, on the whole, in my view—and I think in the view of most people in the West, if they are honest about it—discharged it very well.

Curiously enough, that had been adumbrated half a century before, just after the turn of the year 1900, by Rudyard Kipling. Kipling was then on friendly terms with Theodore Roosevelt and he said to Roosevelt, "You have to take on some of the burdens which Britain has been discharging." And he

wrote the poem, "The White Man's Burden." Leaving aside the white and the color thing, what Kipling really meant—he wasn't making a racial point—was that Britain had tried to spread all over the world certain basic concepts which were part of her civilization: the idea of economic and political freedom, the idea of the rule of law, the sanctity of contracts, the sanctity of international obligations, and so forth—everything which Britain had tried to stand for in the nineteenth century. He realized that Britain was ultimately too weak to carry on this burden, and he wanted the burden to be shared, so his poem was addressed essentially to the United States.

In 1918, America didn't accept that obligation, but it did in 1945. That is the principal reason why we have enjoyed nearly half a century of peace.

Wattenberg: *Did that moment of American dominance spread not only because of the historical factors you've talked about, but because of a certain messianic fervor within the American soul that said, "Listen, we are the only people who really understand how to make things go and create the kind of world we want, and we will export it." In other words, was there an ideological component as well?*

Johnson: Yes, I think there was. Inevitably, there is also an element of hubris in the imperial role, whether it is cultural imperialism or economic, political, and military imperialism.

The Greeks understood that—the notion that hubris is followed by nemesis. In the American case, one can say that hubris led them into Vietnam on a huge scale and nemesis overtook them when they got there.

Wattenberg: *Suppose we had gone into Vietnam and won that war in twelve months?*

Johnson: Well, the hubris would have still more increased, but the nemesis would have been waiting for you somewhere.

This is what the French call *de formation confessionale*, that if you undertake an imperial role—using "imperial" in the good sense of the word—there is a certain disease associated with it.

In particular, when you accept imperial responsibilities, you tend to cre-

ate institutions which take off and pursue a life of their own. This particularly applies to military institutions, but in some respects even more so to intelligence institutions like the CIA. Although I deplore the way in which the CIA has been savaged in recent years, often on the basis of ignorance and prejudice, one can say that there was an element of hubris in some of its operations. I take that as part of the nature of human institutions; one has to watch it and control it. It is not, in itself, a reason for abandoning world responsibility.

Worm in the American Apple

Unfortunately, there is a worm in the American apple. America is a product of Greco-Roman civilization and the English common law. It's also a product of the Bible. And the Bible does implant a notion of guilt. I think the role of guilt in American history is terribly important, and never more so than today because, as if it weren't enough to have biblical feelings of guilt within Americans, they had to have Freud, too.

No society in history has endorsed the vulgar Freudian notions—in many cases, mistaken notions—so enthusiastically as America. They have absolutely lapped it up.

When Lincoln said that Americans were the chosen people, he had in mind this notion of the guilt, but he could not have conceived the power of guilt in American life and in American global politics that was to occur in the twentieth century after the impact of Freudianism. In most other societies, Freudianism just hits the upper crust, but in American society, it reaches right down to the bottom of the social pyramid. The kind of guilt complex which America worked up over Vietnam and then hopelessly so over Watergate would not have been possible in a society which wasn't impregnated with Freudian notions of guilt. That, I think, is at the root of America's troubles at the moment. They feel guilty about what they don't have to be guilty about.

America is too worried today about its mistaken policies in Vietnam and, on top of that, the terrifying, searing scandal of the American presidency with Watergate. Terrible things happen all the time in the world; all nations make mistakes. If you accept responsibilities, as America did at the end of the war, then you're bound to make mistakes,

you have to learn from your mistakes, but you mustn't allow the mistakes and the horror of them to dominate you.

Secondly, if you accept very important roles in the world, you're bound to have a certain corruption of power affecting your institutions. Just as mistaken policies in a certain part of the world, in this case Vietnam, were predictable, so, too, it was predictable that American institutions would suffer some of the scars and damage of having to suddenly embrace enormous responsibilities.

It will be a sign of America's maturity as a great power when it is able to accept its mistakes as inevitable and remediable, just as it accepts its responsibilities. It seems to me that America has been very courageous over the past thirty years in accepting its responsibilities. It must be equally courageous and, to a certain extent, hardboiled in recovering from its mistakes.


Imperialism Can Be Good for You

Wattenberg: *The word "imperial" is normally used in a pejorative sense, but you said, let's use it in its good sense. What is the good sense of imperialism? What does it provide to the world?*

Johnson: The essence of a beneficent empire is that it internationalizes the particular cultural, economic and political virtues of the dominant nation.

The Romans were able to give to the whole of the Mediterranean world certainly very substantial benefits. They gave them a marvelous legal system, they gave them a wonderful system of communications, and they gave them very advanced engineering. What they couldn't give them, alas—and that is why the Roman Empire didn't continue—was industrial mass production. But they gave them three very great blessings so that a thousand years after the collapse of the Roman Empire, it was still retained as a folk memory in people's minds, and even in the late Middle Ages, as a golden age to which people looked back in respect and admiration.

That was an instance of a beneficent empire, and I would make a very powerful case on behalf of the British Empire, too. I think we did give concept not only to the rule of law, but in a deep sense, equality before the law. Like the Roman Empire, ours was essentially a liberal empire, not a totalitarian, oppressive, and autocratic one.



"There is a worm in the American apple . . . the role of guilt in American history is terribly important, and never more so than today."

Johnson

The Americans went a stage further because they didn't have an empire at all; they had an "imperial concept"—that is, they had certain very important obligations to discharge, which weren't always welcome, but they had a duty and they would discharge them. There was an empire without a formal structure but with the same central benevolence motivating it.

The time is coming when we will be able to see the notion of imperialism and empire much more objectively. We are moving out of the emotional stage of anti-colonialism and into a period when we can judge these things on their merits. And on their merits, I would say that such liberal empires are to be welcomed.

Gergen: *You said that you thought that after 1945, the dominance of the American nation was practically inevitable. Was its decline also inevitable?*

Johnson: No. What was inevitable was that there should be some relative decline, because after all America had enabled the world to enjoy not only an entire generation of peace, but thirty years or more of unprecedented economic expansion, and in those circumstances the huge lead that America had, in an economic sense, was bound to be shortened by the growth of major economic powers.

That was, of course, precisely your intention. Any leading power ought to welcome the narrowing of the gap because if the gap is too huge, it creates hostility and hatred and envy, and this is a source of weakness.

What I think has come unexpectedly and has alarmed people is the notion that the power of America has declined absolutely, as well as relatively, and I think if there is substance for this notion, then we ought to deplore it.

Hesitancy among the Elite

Wattenberg: *What is the evidence that this age of dominance is ending or has diminished absolutely, in addition to relatively?*

Johnson: That is a very difficult question to answer because there isn't all that much hard evidence. It is more psychological than anything else.

One tends, for example, to confuse two quite different things: the existence of military power and the willingness to use it. What we have seen in recent

years is an intense unwillingness on the part of the American government to use such military power as it does possess, to the point where people are beginning to doubt whether it actually exists.

That leads to the related point, which I think is the key, that what sustains empires and what sustains nations undertaking imperial roles is not so much the sheer physical strength they possess—though that has to be there in the last resort—but the will and the self-confidence with which they exercise it.

The Vietnam experience meant that the self-confidence in the exercise of power, which is half the battle in exercising it successfully, was eroded.

But again, one has to be careful with distinctions and in the case of the Vietnam experience, one must distinguish the prevailing wisdom among the political elite of the country from the basic understanding and attitudes of the country as a whole, which are particularly important in a mass democracy like America.

The ruling elite in America drew a lot of lessons from Vietnam which I think were mistaken and has been applying them accordingly. But, as far as I can judge, American opinion as a whole has been much less volatile. It didn't overreact to Vietnam; it has been much more consistent. Insofar as polls are capable of indicating these things, the polls you are running in this issue of *Public Opinion* are extremely revealing: they show that in point of fact, the will to exercise power on the part of the American people is still there and, if anything, is increasing. (See Opinion Roundup of this issue.)

The hesitancy springs from the ruling elite, not from the nation en masse.

Dark Age Ahead?

Gergen: *In the event America does not reverse these trends and the elites do not get the message, what would you foresee, both for the United States and for the world?*

Johnson: Well, happily, America is a democracy, and I would foresee the removal of their elite and replacement by another. That's what you have elections for.

Otherwise, all of the lessons of history teach that political power vacuums don't remain vacuums very long. If America creates a vacuum, it will be filled. We will move into a world in

which the uninhibited increase in Soviet military power and, still more, in their political-military influence, would mean that more and more powers on the periphery of an expanding Soviet zone of control would be obliged to make compromises with Moscow and accept a kind of *modus vivendi*, the parameters of which would be determined by Moscow and not by themselves.

It would be an increasingly unpleasant world, a world of appeasement and compromise, and a world in which so-called sovereign independent governments would have to conduct their foreign policies and their internal policies with the Soviet paramountcy in mind.

One inevitably returns to the psychological dimension—the will to use military force and the self-confidence with which you use it. So far as I can see, the Russians don't suffer from the crisis of doubt which overcomes Western man when he has to exercise world responsibilities. And they don't appear to suffer, either, from a sense of guilt.

Therefore, one has to make the hard assumption that they would be prepared to use any military superiority that they were allowed to obtain. They would not necessarily have to use force: the threat of force would be sufficient.

The way this would affect ordinary people outside their direct area of control would be in a movement toward collectivist societies, because there are enough collectivist elements throughout the Third World and throughout the West who would be prepared to take advantage of this shift in power, infiltrating and gradually coming to dominate governments, assisted by the shadow of fear thrown out by the Soviet penumbra of power. We would gradually see increasing isolation of free societies in the West and the spread of collectivist types of governments and societies, which were in broad military and political alliance with the Soviet Union.

I don't believe that the ideals for which America stands now would disappear, but they would go beneath the surface and the collectivist pattern would become the predominant one.

Gergen: *And you can make a case that we would then enter a modern dark age?*

Johnson: Yes. One of the lessons of history that one has to learn, although it is

very unpleasant, is that no civilization can be taken for granted. Its permanency can never be assumed; there is always a dark age waiting for you around the corner, if you play your cards badly and you make sufficient mistakes, and we must never think that this can't happen to us. It can happen to us, as it has happened four or five times in the history of the world.

A Little Help from Our Friends?

Wattenberg: *When do the other members of the club—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—step in and say, America isn't quite doing the job, there is something very important at stake, and we're going to shoulder some of this burden, which the countries in Western Europe have not been noticeably heroic in doing in recent decades?*

Johnson: While all of us might welcome that development, there's no evidence that we're going to see it and that in itself is profoundly depressing. Britain has tried to carry its old world role, as far as it was able. But we have gotten ourselves into such a psychological mess and such an economic mess at home that, at the moment, we are positively incapable of doing it.

What I hope is that we will pull ourselves out of that mess, and then, in due course, contribute our own might, modest though it may be, in promoting world security.

Traditionally, France has played a very selfish, lone role of its own, as it did, very characteristically, in the Iranian crisis, when it allowed the Ayatollah safe refuge in Paris and, at the same time, gave him a daily platform from which he could whip up the anti-Shah mobs.

The two powers who ought to be making their contribution because they are solidly now established democratic republics and enormously successful economically are Japan and West Germany, but for historical reasons, which one needn't explain, they are reluctant to become great military powers again. And I can't see any enthusiasm anywhere that they should change their policy in this respect.

So there you are, the four major secondary powers which might be able to play a bigger role are, for distinctive reasons, unable to do so at the moment. (cont. on page 59)

Did the American Century Really Exist?


While Paul Johnson was visiting AEI, a Pulitzer-Prize winning American historian and the current Librarian of Congress, Dr. Daniel Boorstin, met with him along with two editors of Public Opinion to address the question: *Is the American Century Ending?*

Dr. Boorstin disagreed with Mr. Johnson on several points and questioned the entire notion of "the American century." Excerpts from Dr. Boorstin's remarks follow.

Daniel Boorstin: I would like to go back to the original premise of our conversation, namely that we have lived through "an American century."

If I may say so, I'm rather surprised that Paul Johnson should accept this premise since he has so brilliantly attacked the assumptions behind it in his book, *Enemies of Society*, which I hope everybody will read. The question of "an American century" is rather parochial and is posed in the Marxian-Darwinian vocabulary. It is based on the notion that there are dominant societies and there are subordinate societies, and the survival of the fittest is the survival of the strongest society—which in one age was supposed to have been Rome, in another age was supposed to have been Britain, and then in another age, the United States.

I think that's a fallacy. The relationship of powers in the world is that rather of a spectrum instead of a hierarchy, and the great influence of the United States, which was enormous, of course, for most of modern history, came not from the power of the United States or from the fact that the United States was in a position to dominate or dictate to other people, but because a New World was part of a constellation and the newness of the New World opened opportunities to the old world which hadn't even been imagined. We must remember that for most of history,



"The most significant thing about the notion of an American century . . . is that Henry Luce popularized it. . . . I don't find it a very useful description."

Boorstin

many powers withdrew into themselves. China, for much of modern history, was an isolate.

The influence of powers is not to be measured by their power to dominate, either economically or militarily. It seems to me one could make the case that the most important event in modern history was the discovery of America, the discovery of the New World, the discovery that there was newness, that there were unmeasured, immeasurable, unfathomable resources somewhere in the world, and the mere presence of that fact transformed all the other facts about all the other powers.

In this sense, one might almost say that all the centuries since the early sixteenth have been American centuries because the cast of thinking, the imagination of the world, was enlivened by the possibility of limitless resources:



"The great influence of the United States . . . came not from power . . . but because . . . the newness of the New World opened opportunities to the old world which hadn't even been imagined."

Boorstin

new continents, new colonies, new minerals, new peoples, new everything.

* * *

Perhaps, I'm just being evasive, but I don't like to characterize efforts in the way suggested here because there are so many ways which countries are or are not dominant. There are also so many different facts about an era; that's what impresses me.

The most significant thing about the notion of an American century, from my point of view, is that Henry Luce popularized it. I suspect he didn't make it up, but it had an appeal. Still, I don't find it a very useful description.

* * *

David Gergen: *But there was a time, was there not, when other countries in the postwar years began to look to the United States for leadership, both militarily and economically?*

Boorstin: The question of the power of one country or one civilization over another cannot be answered by seeing the extent to which other countries look to the so-called leader for influence. For example, the Italian civilization was one of the dominant influences in modern Europe, even though there wasn't an Italy—if there is one now; I assume there is—in the nineteenth century. It is easy to mistake the externals of these relationships for the deep and shaping influences which determine the course of civilizations.

America's influence in recent years often was neither so conscious, neither so unidirectional, nor so dominant as the discussion here suggests. I think it has been interstitial. Consider American popular music, for example. It has probably done as much or more to affect the daily lives and consciousness of other people as anything else that's ever come out of this country. And because it's entertainment, solemn academics seem to think it's unimportant, not as significant as if it were education. But it brightens people's lives and that's not negligible.

It is also worth noting that the two powers which had probably the greatest influence in their separate domains—that is, accession of influence, shall we say—since the Second World War are West Germany, a defeated power, and Japan, a defeated power. This, at least, should give one pause about the relation between military might and the influence of trade and of technology and institutions.

* * *

The Transcending Power of Technology

Boorstin: I am rather surprised that Paul Johnson, who is a student of world history, should refer to the influence of Athens on the world because most of the world never heard of Athenian civilization until long after the fifth century B.C., and, in fact, much of China had a more advanced civilization, at least technologically, than the Greeks ever accomplished.

So, we must be wary when we talk about the world. Rather than looking at the issue of American dominance in the world, I think it may be more profitable to focus on our changing notion of what we mean by the "world." There is a kind of provincialism in the emphasis we give to Greek and Roman culture. The most significant fact, as I see it, in the creation of a world—that is, a community of shared techniques and shared attitudes—is technology, not the organization of empires nor even the exercise of military might.

There are certain characteristics in technology which make its powers transcend the powers of military might and reach into the interstices of civilizations and affect them in ways in which no colonial power could. That is, it is interesting to test whether the legacy of free institutions left behind by the British in many parts of the world was as great as the impact of American technology

in places where we never governed and never were able to have governor generals or to train the judges or civil servants.

Ben Wattenberg: *But that's partly the point. What Paul Johnson was saying, if I may interpret his thoughts, was that in the third of a century following World War II, perhaps uniquely in the annals of man, the United States really had the dominant influence, economically and culturally and militarily and technologically.*

That was, it seems to me, a worldwide phenomenon in that every nation in the world represented itself in terms of how it stood vis-à-vis the United States: they were with us or they were agin' us. But that was the dominant fact of the postwar experience. Do you disagree with that?

Boorstin: Everything you say seems to me to be reasonable and correct, but I'm not sure I attach the same significance to it that you do, because I think the influence of the United States and the attitude of the United States, to the extent to which Americans are able to understand the world, depends on many other factors and depends much more on peculiarities of our own domestic history.

I'll give you a couple of examples. Somehow or other, the British were successful in exporting their political institutions—the concept of constitutionalism, due process of law, and the tradition of the common law.

The United States, on the other hand, has proven itself unable or has had great difficulty in coming to grips with the world in the latter twentieth century, not because of a fall from military power, but rather because of the way in which our peculiar history has skewed our thinking about the world and about the forces in the world.

America's Disabilities

There are two great forces in the world today which the peculiar experience of the United States has incapacitated us for estimating: one is religion and the other is race.

In the case of religion, of course, the earliest European settlements in America were based on religion. At least in New England and in British North America, they were settlements with a religious mission to build "a city on a hill."

Then, for much of the rest of American history, religion became domesticated. We've never had a religious war in the United States. And as religion became secularized, it became a part of the folklore of citizenship. We began to think that that's what religion was—something that could be subordinated to the secular and economic and practical aims of the community.

We therefore found ourselves startled when we discovered, as we have in recent months, that religion can mean something else; that it may be something for which people want to kill; it may involve a reactionary orthodoxy which induces people to try to relive a society which is long past.

And, therefore, we've been baffled, even though we are probably the most church-going country in Western civilization. We still don't understand what religion means to the world, I suspect.

At the same time, we have had a peculiar career in relation to race. We're the only country in the world I can think of that has had a war, one of the major purposes of which was to secure racial equality, or at least to erase racial inequality.

That being the case and having accepted, for a while at least, the ideal of racial equality, we have now begun to accept the notion of racial preferences. We justify this new racialism in the United States as part of the folklore of equality, and we fail to realize that in large parts of the world, racism remains a dominant force, and I think a very retrograde force—in Africa, for example, as well as other parts of the world.

In the case of race, peculiarities of our history, the nobility of the aspirations of some of the northern forces in the Civil War and of the whole abolitionist tradition, have deafened us to some of the most strident cries in the world around us. In a world in which technology unites, the atomizing forces—among which I would include religion and race—are the forces which we Americans find it most difficult to grasp.

Paul Johnson: I wouldn't have thought that America's record on race in any way disabled her from being a great world power. Possibly, Americans don't grasp the extent to which they have beaten and solved their race problem. This seems to me one of the most important facts in American history and one of the most important facts in world history over the past ten years.

This huge and terrifying problem, which at one point looked as if it was actually going to overwhelm the republic, is now well on the way to being solved.

A New Racism

Boorstin: Although I agree with Paul Johnson on so many things—and I must say, among the many reasons I'm glad he's here is, to have him bring cheering word—I'm afraid I don't agree with him on this. I take a different attitude toward the whole concept of problems and their solutions than he would.


The problem of race, if you want to call it that, in society becomes a parable of the difficulties of solving all social problems. What's happened in the United States is tragic. The Civil Rights movement was a very important thing and, on the whole, a wonderful thing. It meant a great deal for the improvement of American life, but it didn't solve anything. It's almost the notion of what used to be called homeopathic magic, the notion of the hair of the dog that bit you.

We had been suffering from racism in this country, white racism, and then the assumption was that if the white people had been given unjust preferences as, indeed, they had for much of American history, you could solve this by giving preferences to other groups. The blacks, Chicanos, other so-called minorities, even women began to be considered minorities, which shows how myopic we became.

This suggests that when people try to solve their problems, they don't exercise the reason which you have extolled in your book, Paul. Instead, they are inclined to have been infected with the evil which corrupted their society before, and the solution that they offer tends to be from the same jar.

I don't think any social problem can really be solved, I'll have to say that. But I would say that societies can become more decent and can mitigate the evils of racism by trying to use other criteria than race and by becoming colorblind, which ought to be our objective.

And that is not the objective. For the first time in American history, all kinds of governmental and other records have the assessment of people's races. I assume that the proportion of racial blood that a person has will affect the extent to which a person would count as a member of one race or another. This is a relic of slavery and is not a sign of a



"I would define man as a problem-creating animal. . . . That has been the great thing about our country—we have been able to create problems that nobody else could imagine."

Boorstin

really free society which is solving its race problems.

* * *

I think that if the United States can demonstrate anything to the world, it ought to be able to demonstrate that it's possible for people of different religions and different ethnic origins and different races to live together, to marry each other, to enjoy each other's company, to delight in each other, and not to be perpetually conscious of the racial barrier—racial distinctions, you might say.

* * *

Freud and Our Discontents

Boorstin: I don't think I would go along with Paul Johnson on the question of guilt in America. Johnson argues that the Bible and Freud have had a deep impact upon the American psyche, breeding a strong sense of guilt. I think that's an excessively sophisticated interpretation of the vogue of Freud in this country. I hate to say that Freud's popularity and his influence is due to the sense of guilt. I think, rather, it sort of fits with the American interest in gadgets, intellectual or otherwise. It attests to the American sense of control—you want to be able to control yourself, your relation to your wife and your kids, and your parents, and so on. It's an expression of individualism—which is a very wholesome sentiment—because it says, in effect, that nothing is more important than the individual (cont. on page 60)

THE AMERICAN SHIELD:

HOW OTHERS SEE IT TODAY



by Werner Kaltfleiter

Germans: Friendlier but Apprehensive

With Willy Brandt and his dreams of Ostpolitik fading into the background, growing numbers of West Germans are now expressing concern about their national security as well as skepticism about Western military strength.

In 1962, at the end of Konrad Adenauer's chancellorship, roughly two-thirds of the 1,500 West Germans interviewed by the EMNID Institute of Bielefeld said that communism posed a serious threat to their country. Subsequent surveys found that the number perceiving such a threat dropped during the 1960s and fell as low as 35 percent in 1974. Since then, however, the number who feel threatened by communism has risen and in 1978 reached 46 percent. Conversely, the number who believe that communism is *not* a serious threat stood at 22 percent in 1962, rose to 56 percent in 1971, and in 1978 registered 50 percent of all respondents.

One of the most striking findings to emerge from the annual EMNID surveys is that over the past two decades, West German trust in the military strength

Table 1

Question: Who do you think has at present the greater military potential, NATO or the East (Warsaw Pact)?

	1962	1969	1971	1974	1976	1977	1978
NATO	37%	24%	15%	14%	13%	19%	14%
Warsaw Pact	8	21	25	27	35	28	35
Both equal	26	39	55	42	34	40	47
Not ascertained	29	18	4	17	18	14	4

Source: Surveys by the EMNID Institute in Bielefeld.

of NATO has almost vanished. In 1962, 37 percent believed that NATO was superior to the Warsaw Pact in military potential; in 1978, only 14 percent thought that NATO was still ahead while 35 percent regarded the Warsaw Pact as superior. (See Table 1.)

Parallel developments have occurred in West Ger-

Table 2

Question: Taken altogether, are the armed forces of the U.S.A. as strong as, superior to, or weaker than those of the Soviet Union?

	1962	1969	1971	1974	1976	1977	1978
As strong	39%	49%	60%	53%	48%	52%	57%
U.S. stronger	20	21	16	10	9	14	11
U.S. weaker	10	14	19	18	24	22	28
Not ascertained	31	15	5	19	18	13	4

Source: Surveys by the EMNID Institute in Bielefeld.

man attitudes toward American military strength. At the beginning of the sixties, the United States was regarded as stronger than the Soviet Union, but since the early seventies, superiority has been conceded to the Soviets. During this same period, there has been a large reduction in the number of "undecideds" and a rise in the number who believe the superpowers are equally strong. (See Table 2.) An interesting sidelight is that 57 percent now consider NATO and the Warsaw Pact equally strong, while only 47 percent see such equality between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Obviously, some people realize that the other communist members of the Warsaw Pact contribute more to the strength of the East than do other western nations to NATO.

West Germans are evenly divided in their assessment of whether NATO forces, joined with their own army, would be strong enough to withstand an attack by the Russians and East Germans. Some 48 percent say "yes," and 47 percent say "no." This close division has existed for nearly two decades; the only substantial difference is that the number of "undecideds" has dropped off significantly, falling from 40 percent in 1961 to 5 percent in 1978.

American Presence: Indispensable

Given the doubts that West Germans harbor about their security, it is not surprising that the number who want U.S. troops to remain in their country and who want the Federal Republic to remain in NATO are now at the highest levels in the past two decades. In 1970, some 48 percent said that American troops posted there helped to secure peace; in 1978 that figure had jumped to 87 percent. Similarly, the number who believe that the presence of U.S. troops is "important" or "indispensable" has risen from 72 percent in 1970 to 83 percent in 1978. Still a third survey question has determined that 83 percent now want U.S. troops to stay in the Federal Republic and only 14 percent want them withdrawn; compare those numbers to 1971, during the height of Ostpolitik, when nearly a third (29 percent)


wanted U.S. troops to leave and 70 percent wanted them to stay.

The intense desire for American troops to remain on German soil does not reflect unhappiness with German forces. To the contrary, the preparedness of West Germany's own army, the Bundeswehr, is more highly regarded today than in the past: some 63 percent say it is adequately armed (compared to 33 percent in 1968) and 80 percent believe its training and leadership are adequate (compared to 51 percent in 1974). The problem that most West Germans recognize is their vulnerability in the event of an American troop withdrawal; if the nation were then subjected to a surprise attack, West Germans are convinced by a three-to-one margin that they would be overrun.

Support for NATO participation has always been high, but today it is higher than ever: 80 percent want to stay in NATO, 13 percent want to stay in a NATO that is modified in unspecified ways, and only 2 percent want to leave.

As their security perceptions have changed, West Germans are also expressing a less sanguine view about their relations with the Soviet Union and East Germany. In 1972, during the active period of Ostpolitik, some 56 percent foresaw an improvement in German-Soviet relations; today that number has dropped to 22 percent, while the number who expect no change has increased to 68 percent. Those who want improved relations with the Soviets have also dropped—from 82 percent in 1971 to 72 percent in 1978. In the same period, interest in better relations with the German Democratic Republic has not dropped as much (from 77 percent to 67 percent), but there has been a sharp rise (from 30 percent to 73 percent) in those who insist on tougher policies toward the East German regime. In contrast, these same years—1972 and 1978—have seen the number who want closer relations with France increase from 46 percent to 72 percent and those who want closer relations with the United States swell from 66 percent to 87 percent of respondents.

In summary, Germans today are more aware of a



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communist threat than earlier in the seventies and their trust in both NATO and American military strength is weakened. But as that trust ebbs, more and more West Germans want to keep American troops in Europe and keep their own country in NATO. At the same time, hope for détente is gone, and while a majority still want improved relations with the East, an increasing number believe—especially in the case of East Germany—that this goal should be reached by tougher policies.



by Hans Zetterberg,
with Greta Frankel and Karin Busch

In Sweden, Both Superpowers Slipping

As the 1970s come to an end, the people of Sweden appear to be turning somewhat inward and are showing scant confidence in either of the world's great superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The growing ethnocentric flavor in Swedish life is reflected in surveys taken in 1973 and 1978 by SIFO, the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research in Stockholm (standard sample size is 1,000 individuals). In the earlier survey, when people were asked "Which countries do you think it is most important our nation cooperates with?", 50 percent named other Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Norway, Finland, or Iceland. In 1978, the same question drew a 59 percent response in favor of Sweden's northern neighbors. The increase, while not overwhelming, is markedly in contrast to other changes in the two surveys. (See Table 1.)

Table 1
COOPERATING WITH OTHER NATIONS

	1973	1978
Nordic countries	50%	59%
Common market countries (except Denmark)	23	21
USA	11	11
Soviet Union	8	4
Underdeveloped countries	3	2

Source: Surveys by the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research.

The results also suggest that the United States does not stand out in the public's mind as a more important working partner than it did during the final phase of the Vietnam War, in spite of the fact that public opinion toward the United States has become more positive since the war. As for the Soviet Union, the lessened interest in cooperation is attributable mostly to changes among the young; in 1973, many of them gave priority to such cooperation and today they show less enthusiasm.

For the Superpowers, Good News and Bad

To the extent that the superpowers are searching for

respect and affection among the Swedes, they can find both good news and bad in SIFO surveys over the past twenty years. During the cold war days of 1957, some 67 percent of the Swedes expressed positive views when asked whether they had "a very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad opinion" of the United States. Those positive attitudes declined sharply during the Vietnam War, falling to 36 percent in 1969 and 24 percent in 1972—an all time low. More recently, Swedish attitudes toward the United States have improved somewhat, reaching the 1969 level of 36 percent positive, but that is still far below the earlier levels.

In Swedish opinion, "the American century" ended under Johnson's administration, not under Nixon's as is often assumed.

In contrast, the Soviet Union was held in very low esteem in 1957, but Swedish attitudes became rapidly more favorable during the 1960s and reached a peak during the early 1970s. During the late seventies, attitudes turned much more negative, as Gulag apparently had the same negative impact on public opinion as Vietnam and Watergate. Still, the Soviets are now regarded with much less hostility than during the 1950s:

Table 2
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SUPERPOWERS

	1957	1969	1972	1978
<i>Soviet Union</i>				
Good opinion	2%	10%	16%	8%
Bad opinion	82	40	24	53
Neither bad nor good	12	46	41	36
<i>United States</i>				
Good opinion	67	36	24	36
Bad opinion	3	19	28	18
Neither good nor bad	27	43	42	42

Source: Survey by Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research.

Attitudes toward the behavior of the two superpowers in world politics follows nearly the same pattern as the general impressions that Swedes have of these countries. Consider the responses when SIFO has asked "How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to deal wisely with present world problems: very great, considerable, little, or very little?":

Table 3
DEALING WITH WORLD PROBLEMS:
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

	1969	1972	1978
<i>Soviet Union</i>			
Very great/considerable confidence	18%	26%	10%
Little/very little	75	62	78
<i>United States</i>			
Very great/considerable confidence	50	26	35
Little/very little	43	62	52

Source: Surveys by Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research.

A striking finding is that a majority of Swedes now have little confidence in the policies of either of the great superpowers. For Sweden, nonalignment has thus meant not only neutrality but increasing estrangement from the United States.

Lower Resistance to Attack

There have also been notable changes in recent years in Swedish attitudes toward their own military posture. As a nonaligned country, Sweden must pay for its own defense and maintain its own military-industrial complex. Spending for defense has declined from 4.6 percent of the nation's GNP in 1968 to 3.7 percent in 1978. As the levels have dropped, the number who believe that Sweden is spending too little on defense has risen somewhat—from 12 percent in the early 1960s to 19 percent in 1975-78.

Yet, in the years since World War II, the willingness of Swedes to resist armed attack—and especially young Swedes—has declined slowly but fairly steadily. The question has been posed in this fashion: "If Sweden were attacked, do you think we should offer armed resistance even if the outcome seems uncertain?" In periodic surveys since 1952, the number of adults who have answered "yes" has declined from a high of 82 percent in 1956 to 68 percent in 1978. The steepest drop has occurred among young people, ages eighteen to twenty-four: 81 percent supported Swedish resistance in 1965, compared to only 55 percent in 1978.

We know from other studies that the youngest age group is most affected by the "intraceptive" values that have spread throughout the Western World in recent decades. These values give priority to a person's inner life in contrast to external events and put individual interests ahead of collective ones. Patriotism and symbols of military strength fare poorly in such a value climate, which now prevails in Sweden as in other advanced countries, particularly among the more educated.

Another factor that may bear on willingness to resist attack is public uncertainty about the effectiveness of Swedish defense forces. Beginning in 1976, SIFO started asking this question: "Suppose there is a war among the superpowers, and that one of the parties is considering an attack on our country in spite of the fact that he can divert but a small part of his military strength against us. What chance do you think our defense would have of deterring him from an attack?" The answers in 1978, which were similar to those of 1976, showed that 28 percent thought the chances were "very good" or "rather good," while 50 percent thought they were "rather small" or "very small." It is noteworthy that 40 percent of the men thought the chances of deterrence were good compared to only 17 percent of the women.

As part of its defense efforts, the Swedish government has participated very actively in the disarmament effort within the United Nations and in the search for a ban on so-called "inhumane weapons." Alvin Myrdal's

book, *The Game of Disarmament*, represents not only an informed view but also the general current of opinion. An overwhelming majority of Swedes, 67 percent, favor a speed-up in the SALT talks, and an even larger number, 73 percent, want the industrial nations to sell fewer arms to developing countries. Most Swedes also report that they would feel safer if they were to hear news about nuclear arms limitations.

Nonetheless, the main tenet put forth by the advocates of radical disarmament, namely, that modern armaments increase rather than decrease danger of conflict, is rejected by a majority of Swedes. Some 75 percent say they feel about as safe as before when Swedish armed forces acquire new weapons. There is, however, an interesting ripple in opinions among the young: every tenth young person feels less safe when Swedish armed forces acquire new weapons.

* * *

One of the interesting questions posed by this review of Swedish survey data is whether these same attitudes prevail in other Nordic countries. Time did not permit a more extensive study of that issue. In terms of military and economic alliances, the Nordic countries obviously do not represent a single unit. Iceland, Norway, and Denmark are members of NATO. Finland, although western in orientation, has a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Denmark is a full member of the European Economic Community, and Sweden maintains a policy of nonalliance in peace in order to stay neutral in case of war. Despite these different allegiances, however, the Nordic countries have shown in the past that they often share a community of values. Thus, it would not be wholly surprising to find that many of the attitudes of Swedes discussed here could also be found in other countries of Northern Europe.

by Richard Rose



Brits Turn Inward

One advantage of no longer being a great power is that you no longer have to worry about the state of the world. Britons are enjoying this new found luxury to the hilt. When opinion polls ask English people what they think are the most important problems facing the country today, foreign affairs and national security literally rank nowhere—that is, less than 1 percent of the population consider international issues important so that the results are not even tabulated.

A majority of British people (51 percent) aspire for their country to be more like neutral and prosperous Sweden or Switzerland, whereas only 31 percent tell the Gallup poll that they would like to see Great Britain a world power again. One obstacle to achieving this

goal is that Britain has a population of 55 million people, which means it has eight times more mouths to feed than Sweden and nine times more than Switzerland. Another difficulty is that the British economy has not grown through the years like the Swedish, nor is the English pound valued as highly by foreigners as is the Swiss franc.

The chief threat to the security of ordinary English people today is economic. As a nation that has imported food for more than 125 years, Britain must literally export to live. But increasingly, British firms are facing strong competition from Asian and Latin American industries, as well as from their neighbors within Europe. The falling value of the pound, down by more than one-third in foreign exchange value in the past decade, is the most immediately visible symbol of the country's international economic vulnerability.

Britons do not need to travel abroad or read reports by visiting American journalists to see the extent of their economic difficulties. Inflation is evident in the prices at the corner shop and unemployment in the dole queues. Monthly announcements of the rise in the cost of living and in the numbers unemployed only confirm what many people witness daily at first hand.

Save the Pound, Not the Dollar

The extent of economic concern is reflected by a British Gallup poll in January 1979 asking what bothered people the most: 80 percent named problems that were economic in character. Law and order came next in significance, but it was seen as one of the country's top two problems by only 5 percent of respondents.

Given great economic difficulties close to home, few English people have time or energy to worry about international issues that concern Washington, Moscow, and Peking.

Interestingly, in a start-of-the-year Gallup poll, 45 percent of British respondents said they expected 1979 to be a year of international discord, while only 16 percent expected it to be peaceful. The optimists are fewer than at almost any time in the twenty-two year record of responses. In addition, the proportion of "don't knows" about the state of the world, 39 percent, is now higher than ever before recorded.

Although British people no longer give much attention to international affairs, they continue to see the world through NATO-colored glasses, looking to Amer-

Table 1

Question: Do you think that the United States/Russia does or does not pose a threat to Britain and other European countries in the:

	Russia		U.S.A.	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Military field	77%	8%	31%	52%
Political field	64	21	21	64
Scientific field	60	22	37	47
Economic field	44	38	35	47

Source: British Gallup poll survey, June 1978. "Don't knows" omitted in above table.

ica as a friend and ally and viewing the Soviet Union as a threat. More than three-quarters of Britons see Russia as a military threat, as against less than one-third perceiving America as a military threat (Table 1). Nearly two-thirds see Communist Russia as a political threat, too.

Hostility to the Soviet Union is higher than hostility to China, perhaps because Britain was not involved in either the Korean or Vietnam conflicts and because it harbored many anxieties about Stalin's Russia. The latest British Gallup poll (January 1979) shows that 22 percent think Russia should be treated as a friendly nation, and 64 percent say to treat her with suspicion. By contrast, 45 percent are ready to treat China as friendly, and 40 percent inclined to treat China with suspicion.

The United States: A Foundering Friend

British attitudes toward the United States are based upon long-standing friendship and understanding. When asked to rate other countries on a scale ranging from plus five to minus five, America comes on top of the international list, with 74 percent giving British Gallup interviewers a positive reply and only 15 percent a negative rating. Germany comes second, viewed positively by 65 percent, 6 percent more than feel positively about France. The numbers suggest that popularity is based upon current achievements and not upon wartime alliances. Japan is viewed positively by 49 percent of British people and Italy by 42 percent. Russia definitely comes at the bottom of the heap, for 63 percent give it a negative rating (33 percent assign Russia the worst of all possible ratings, minus five on the scalometer).

British sympathy with America does not, however, automatically generate confidence in American foreign policy. In May 1977, a few months after the inauguration of President Carter, a majority (54 percent) of Britons expressed positive confidence in America's ability to deal wisely with world problems. Since then, a majority has expressed little or no confidence in America's handling of world problems (Table 2).

Table 2

Question: How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?

	May 1977	January 1978	January 1979
Very great	54%	33%	34%
Considerable			
Little	38	51	53
Very little			
None at all	8	15	14
Don't know			

Source: British Gallup polls.

Lack of confidence in America is combined with a British perception that Russian and Chinese power is increasing in a way that America's is not. A total of 52 percent expect China will increase its power in 1979,

and 48 percent see Russia doing so, compared to 31 percent anticipating an increase in American power. Since 1973, America has ranked behind both countries in this Gallup measure of relative power, and it has not ranked first since 1964. A turn-of-the-year Gallup poll also found that 25 percent now say that the Soviet Union is the most powerful nation in the world, compared to 20 percent who are willing to say that about the United States. Hence, when 41 percent indicate they wish to see Russian-American talks about limiting strategic weapons speeded up and another 35 percent wishing them continued as at present, with only 9 percent asking for a slow down, this is likely to reflect a British belief that time is against the Western alliance.

At home, English people also express an increasing lack of confidence in their own government's ability to secure public order. Such talk emerged first in right-wing and army circles, following occasional racial disturbances in the late 1960s, and even more, following frequent and fatal armed clashes in Northern Ireland.

Elite concerns about internal conflict are now shared by a significant proportion of the British public. An autumn 1977 Gallup poll found that 45 percent saw no risk whatever of a world war in the next decade, but only 16 percent were equally confident there would be no civil disorder in the next decade. In all, 51 percent think there is at least a fifty-fifty chance of civil disorder in the next decade as opposed to 35 percent who believe world war is likely. With worries like this in England's green and pleasant land, few English people have the time or inclination to contribute to the formation of an informed public opinion about international security today.



by Fuji Kamiya

Japanese Seek Middle Course

Since the beginning of the 1970s, and particularly in the latter half of the decade, the mood and tenor of debate in Japan regarding the issue of defense has changed perceptibly.

The most remarkable change is the virtual disappearance of controversy over two issues that divided the nation's political leaders for some twenty years: namely, whether Japan should continue to be a willing partner in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and whether Japan should maintain her own Self-Defense Forces. The government-conservative coalition and the anti-government progressives have been diametrically opposed on these questions since the 1950s, but today, for all intents and purposes, neither the treaty nor the military forces are an issue between the ruling and opposition parties. The chief opposition forces—including the Democratic Socialists, the Komeito, the Socialists, and even the Communists—have all moved toward a more accommodating posture, or as is sometimes said, to-

ward being "more realistic."

A number of domestic and international factors combined to bring about these changes in policy among the opposition parties. Domestically, an important factor is that historical experience with the Treaty and the SDF has proved more and more popular. A public opinion poll cited in the government's *Defense White Paper* in July 1978 showed that 63 percent of the respondents consider the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty "useful" to the peace and security of Japan as against 13 percent who consider it "not useful." An *Asahi* newspaper poll reported on November 1 of the same year showed that 49 percent find the Treaty "in Japan's interest" and 13 percent find it "not in Japan's interest." As for the Self-Defense Forces, 83 percent of the respondents in the *White Paper* poll "prefer having them" as against 7 percent who "prefer not having them." In the *Asahi* poll, 76 percent wanted to "continue the status quo" or to "strengthen" the Self-Defense Forces, as against 5 percent who wanted to "abolish" them. These figures have convinced the opposition forces, especially since the emergence of a relative balance between conservatives and progressives in the mid-1970s, that they could not oppose just for the sake of opposition. "Becoming more realistic" was for them, in a sense, inevitable.

Yankees, Don't Go Home

More important, however, than the domestic situation were new developments in the international situation. The first of these was the trend toward American military withdrawal from Asia, as manifested in the Nixon Doctrine, the fall of Vietnam, the Carter policy of withdrawing American ground troops from Korea, and the pledge of military evacuation from Taiwan as a result of the normalization of relations with China. When the United States had a posture of military "overpresence" in Asia, the Japanese people were often critical of it. But when the signs of military "disengagement" appeared, they began to feel apprehensive. Fearing that Korea might be the next spot for withdrawal after Vietnam, even those who had attacked U.S. intervention in Vietnam began urgently seeking reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment.

A second, important international development was the "oil crisis," which occurred at almost the same time as the American troop withdrawal from Vietnam and taught the Japanese once again about the vulnerability of a nation with few natural resources. The Japanese people came to feel even more acutely the importance of the United States and, specifically, the necessity for maintaining the U.S.-Japan relationship harmoniously.

Still a third development with enormous implications for Japan has been China's shift from all-out opposition to all-out support for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Having normalized relations with the People's Republic in 1972 and

concluded a treaty in 1978, the Japanese could hardly ignore the changes in Chinese policies.

Consequently, it is understandable that, along with the policy changes among the opposition parties, clear changes have come to be visible in the government's defense policy as well. Two recent examples are the November 1978 decision to increase Japan's share of the costs of the U.S. military bases in Japan and the adoption of the "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation" by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. As a result of the former decision, Japan will allocate \$700 million in the fiscal year 1979 toward the costs of stationing U.S. troops in Japan, in contrast to the U.S. share of \$1.1 billion. This latter action has, for the first time, supplied a framework for military operations which has, until now, been lacking in the Security Treaty.

While there have been significant changes in Japan's approach to international security issues, it must also be pointed out that there remains, as before, a firm, basic structure regarding the nation's defense needs and U.S.-Japanese security relations. To mention only what has changed without addressing what remains the same—as some U.S. journalists have done—can be very misleading.

What, then, is the basic, unchanged structure of Japanese attitudes? One indication is the trend of public opinion concerning Japan's future defense. In the *White Paper* poll, 29 percent favored "continuation of the Security Treaty and an increase in self-defense capability" and an equal percentage desired the "status quo in both the Security Treaty and self-defense capability"; 6 percent favored the opposite choice, "abrogation of the Security Treaty and reduction of self-defense capability"; and only 2 percent desired "immediate abolition of both the Security Treaty and self-defense capability." Those who selected the autonomous defense response—"abrogation of the Security Treaty and strengthening of the Self-Defense Forces"—came to only 5 percent. Moreover, support for an "autonomous defense" appears to have declined: in a 1969 poll published in the 1977 *Defense Yearbook*, 13 percent chose that response, compared to the 5 percent who preferred it in 1978. Thus, the Japanese continue to show minimal interest in becoming militarily independent.

As for Japan's future defense strength, 33 percent in the *White Paper* poll thought it is "all right as at present," while 22 percent felt it "should aim at modernization in response to the progress of science and technology." In comparison, 11 percent thought it "should be increased more than at present" and 9 percent feel it "should be reduced beyond the present point." In the *Asahi* poll: 19 percent favored "strengthening" the Self-Defense Forces; 57 percent favored "proceeding as at present"; 11 percent favored "reducing" the Self-Defense Forces; and 5 percent favored "abolishing" them. Thus, there is considerable support for keeping the Self-Defense Forces at their present

level of capability, with slightly more in favor of strengthening it than weakening it.

Broadly speaking, the notion that Japan is still taking a "free ride" on matters of security and defense is nothing but an erroneous myth. At the same time, however, despite the changing tenor of the defense debate, the Japanese people show little interest in forming an autonomous defense force. The Japanese are as conservative as ever about these questions, and there is not the slightest thought of parting from the United States.



by Jerome Jaffre

French Look to Europe

While the Communist party remains a potent force in France and continues to cause some anxiety in neighboring countries, recent surveys show that the French people are firmly committed to their friendships with other Western democracies and want to stay within a Western alliance system.

The most recent national poll by SOFRES, a survey organization in Paris, found that in November 1978, a majority of the French people harbored much warmer feelings toward other Western nations than toward the Soviet Union and China. Some 60 percent, for example, said they found Great Britain "very" or "somewhat attractive"; 55 percent said the same of the United States; 54 percent, West Germany; 50 percent, Italy. Compare those results to the 33 percent who expressed warm feelings toward China and the 24 percent who felt that way toward the Soviet Union. In fact, Russia was the only nation that a plurality of respondents (40 percent) found unattractive.

The 1978 results also show that positive attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. have declined significantly since the mid-sixties, when the Soviets were thought to be more committed to peaceful coexistence and when their brand of socialism was still viewed with favor by a large faction of the French population. During these same years, there has also been some deterioration in warmth toward West Germany but an improvement in attitudes

Table 1
FAVORABLE ATTITUDES TOWARD
THE GREAT POWERS BY PARTY PREFERENCE

	Approval by the Communists	Approval by the Socialists	Approval by the Giscardists	Approval by the Gaullists
Great Britain	57%	64%	65%	60%
U.S.A.	35	55	67	66
West Germany	36	55	69	67
Italy	55	51	55	48
China	37	35	35	28
U.S.S.R.	60	21	15	15

Source: SOFRES, national poll, November 25-30, 1978.

Table 2
MILITARY ALLIANCE OR NEUTRALITY

Question: Which solution seems to you best for France?

	Preference by Party				
	The Nation	Approval by the Communists	Approval by the Socialists	Approval by the Giscardists	Approval by the Gaullists
Participate in a Western military alliance	47%	23%	51%	64%	62%
Between the countries of Europe but independent of the United States	(28)	(15)	(34)	(35)	(28)
Between the countries of Europe and the United States	(19)	(8)	(17)	(29)	(34)
Participate in a military alliance with the U.S.S.R.	2	7	1	—	1
Participate in no alliances, take a position of absolute neutrality	30	47	32	18	24
No opinion	21	23	16	18	13
	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Louis Harris, France, national poll, January 18-24, 1979.

toward Great Britain, possibly linked to its entry into the European Community.

The 1978 SOFRES survey indicates that the most significant cleavage within the electorate regarding attitudes toward other nations is between the Communists and the rest of the voters, not between left and right. It is particularly striking that the Gaullists and Giscardists rank other nations in exactly the same order of preference, placing West Germany and the United States at the top of the list. The Communists are most favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union (though the margin is small) but have little love for China. (See Table 1.)

Other French survey findings confirm this sense of belonging to the Western world. Thus, when respondents are asked to name France's "best friend," West Germany leads with 33 percent of the responses and the United States comes next with 22 percent; China and the Soviet Union are mentioned by 3 and 2 percent of the respondents, respectively. Conversely, when asked (well before the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in June 1978) which countries should be considered threats to peace, respondents named first the Socialist countries (U.S.S.R. 40 percent, Cuba 24 percent, and China 17 percent), and then the Middle Eastern countries (between 11 and 17 percent); the United States was considered a threat by only 16 percent of the respondents. Three years ago the threat of world conflagration seemed to come from the Middle East; now, according to French public opinion, it is the risk of a real clash between two Communist powers in Southeast Asia.


European versus Atlantic Alliance

Recent French public opinion data on attitudes toward national security and the relative strengths of the superpowers is practically nonexistent, but the Louis Harris organization did conduct a survey in January 1979 on

attitudes toward neutrality and military alliances. The Harris poll found that far more people wanted to participate in a Western alliance than to declare neutrality (47-30 percent). Moreover, only a tiny minority of 2 percent wanted to reverse directions and form an alliance with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, American readers may find it of interest that in matters of security the French set more store by European than Atlantic solidarity: only 19 percent of the respondents want France to return to NATO while 28 percent favor a European alliance that is independent of the United States. (See Table 2.)

Here, too, the cleavage lies between Communist sympathizers and the rest of the electorate. While only a very small proportion of Communist sympathizers (7 percent) hope for an alliance with the Soviet Union, a majority express support for absolute neutrality. Among supporters of all of the other parties including the Socialists, a majority favors alliance with the West—the Giscardists and the Socialists opting for a straight European framework, the Gaullists for the Atlantic alliance.

These findings should not be made to say more than they actually do. It would be wrong, for example, to see them as evidence that French opinion has renounced the Gaullist conception of foreign policy and of France's role in the world. In General de Gaulle's day, the French felt strong ties to the West and resisted the temptation of neutrality. Today they remain jealous of their national autonomy. They may be prepared to consider close diplomatic cooperation with the rest of Europe, but a clear majority (52 percent against 35 percent) reject the possibility of making defense a function of the European Community. In a word, French public opinion willingly acknowledges France's ties to the West—more to Europe than to the United States—but also insists that the French government not hand over ultimate control of the nation's security. ☑



by Robert Worcester

MADE IN
THE USA

The Label may be Fading

Vice Premier Wang Zhen put it neatly: "We must be realistic. China will buy from Britain only so long as your goods are competitive and your delivery times reliable."

To my knowledge, there has not yet been a survey of the attitudes in the People's Republic of China toward the competitiveness and delivery times of British goods. But if the image of British products and services is no better in China than it is in Europe, Britain is in for a hard time. And, if European attitudes are anything to go by—as revealed by a recent survey—so, too, is America.

Several articles in the current issue of *Public Opinion* examine the attitudes of foreign countries toward the United States on security issues. To concentrate solely on security questions, however, is to slight a significant area of growing concern and tension between the United States and its European allies: international trade. While security issues occupy their fair share of news stories, Europeans are increasingly apprehensive about the reliability of the United States as an economic partner and they are less and less awed by the quality of American goods. For U.S. companies trying to sell goods and services abroad, these perceptions could make or break future sales.

Drawing upon opinion research corporation work in the late 1950s and early 1960s, companies learned to think in terms of four "image elements" when they were trying to promote their products: the image of the *product class* itself, for example, beer versus soft drinks; the *brand image* or characteristics that differentiate one company's brand from another in its class, for example, Pepsi versus Coca Cola; the image of the *users* of the brand, for example, the readers of the *Daily News* on the one hand, those of the *Times* on the other; and finally, the *corporate* image, the image of the company that stands behind the brand.

There is another dimension, however, that has come to be recognized in more recent years and was put so succinctly by Vice Premier Wang: the image of the country delivering the goods. I first came across this side of marketing—the "fifth dimension" as I have

called it—in a survey of British attitudes nine years ago. The survey found that the British who thought Heinz was British owned (and a majority of the public not only thinks Heinz means beans but British as well) regarded it much more favorably than those who knew it to be American. The obverse was true of Cadbury Schweppes: those people who thought it was owned by American shareholders thought significantly less well of it than those who knew it to be British.

Subsequent surveys have helped to confirm the existence of the "fifth dimension." Several years ago, the London based television company, Thames, took over Channel 9 in New York City for a single week, providing all of the programming and commercials. As part of that experiment, my survey firm in London, Market & Opinion Research International (MORI), conducted a survey in New York City and found that while the British people were regarded as friendly and Britain was a country New Yorkers would especially like to visit, British products rated poorly (as did French), compared to Japanese and German products. British and French products were seen to be of relatively poor value, and Britain was thought to have a stagnant economy plagued by strikes.


A similar pattern emerged in a MORI survey in West Germany a year later where Germans were asked to evaluate six different countries in terms of the quality of their products, the value of their products and services, their economy, their record of strikes, delivery times, responses to customers and the like. The United States was given outstanding marks for producing technically advanced products of good value and high quality. The Netherlands scored best on its strike record and on the quality of its products. And Britain and Italy brought up the rear on most image attributes, with Italy's image considerably worse than Britain's on most factors.

These results reinforced the idea of a "fifth dimension" in international marketing and provided the background to a five-nation European study conducted just last year under MORI's auspices. In the most recent study, approximately 400 respondents were interviewed

in each of five different countries: Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The sample, over 2,000 in all, was selected from upper middle class households, which would be defined as professional and managerial by U.S. standards. Our intention was to find out how these Europeans compared other countries (including the United States but not Japan) on the quality of their products, the value of their products and services, the technical advancement of their goods, the prosperity of their economies, the timeliness of their deliveries, responsiveness to customers' wishes, labor strikes, and the degree of governmental restrictions on their economies. The question was posed in this form: "I'm going to ask your opinion of various countries. Which of these countries (using a show card) would you say in general . . . produces the highest quality products, produces the lowest quality products, and so on?" To avoid confusion, respondents were not asked to rate their own countries. Thus, in the Netherlands, respondents were asked to rate Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States.

From country to country, we found the rank order of other nations to be strikingly similar. Thus, the West Germans scored the best average in *all* of the nations surveyed. The United States came in second, but only squeaked in ahead of the Netherlands in the ratings given by both French and German respondents. Overall, the Netherlands came in third and even came in on top in German eyes. France ranked fourth overall and Belgium fifth. Britain was rated negatively in other countries, coming sixth overall, and Italy was rated seventh. (For an example of the rankings, see Figure 1, which displays the views of British respondents.)


Figure 1
IMAGE OF COUNTRIES: GREAT BRITAIN



Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI), 1978.

On a ± 100 scoring system, giving equal weight to each image attribute, the Germans scored 66 percent, the Americans 35 percent, the Dutch 33 percent, the Belgians 17 percent, the French 6 percent, the British minus 11 percent, and the Italians minus 35 percent. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2
OVERALL COUNTRY IMAGE



Note: A country regarded entirely favorably would score +100, while one regarded entirely unfavorably would score -100.

Source: Survey by Market & Opinion Research International (MORI), 1978.

The results give the Germans ample reason for pride—they were well in front in every country—but hardly make pleasant reading for the British and Americans. Being British by adoption, I was personally disheartened by the failure of Great Britain to live up to its "sterling" reputation. The British have long thought that they make expensive goods but goods of excellent quality and exceedingly good value; that opinion is not shared on the continent of Europe today.

As for the Americans, their reputation, like the dollar, has declined from the halcyon days of the 1950s. Only in one area did the United States score higher than other countries: Europeans tended to think that the United States had fewer governmental restrictions on its economy than did other nations. The United States also came in a close second to the West Germans on the technological advancement of its products, but in all other areas, it trailed Germany by largish margins.

It is widely believed, although there are no data to prove it, that fifty years ago, British goods enjoyed the image of highest quality, best value and the rest. And twenty-five years ago, American goods were considered the best. But now all that appears to have changed.

What do we make of the "fifth dimension"? Of what importance is it to a British company, an American company, or a French company? How does an industrial buyer, a politician, or a civil servant consider the place of nationality in his or her decision making?

In opinion and attitude research, we measure perceptions, not facts. And it is perceived in Europe today that American goods are not of as good quality nor are they as good value for money as German products. This may or may not be true, but the fact remains, *this is the perception*. And in the real world of commerce, industry, and politics, it is the perception that pertains. ☑

What the Polls Tell Us About Foreign Policy

In preparing the Opinion Roundup section for this issue, Public Opinion asked a panel of commentators to review the foreign policy data displayed on pages 21-31 and to offer brief thoughts about their meaning. Their replies are printed below.

Domestic public opinion has been considered a sick patient by foreign policy planners ever since domestic opposition to the Vietnam War eroded the "national consensus" established in the late forties and fifties. Fearing that the body politic might not pay the price for the "next Vietnam," they diagnosed the disease as a "weak national will" and prescribed strong doses of scare stories about U.S. military weakness. New Mayaguez encounters are sought as a cure-all.

But these polls are convincing evidence that there is no serious illness at all. The Americans who responded have a realistic view of our problems and seem determined to avoid past mistakes. Almost 60 percent feel the United States is respected less today than ten years ago, but only 18 percent blame the decline on Soviet military power. While 64 percent regard Iran as a "serious situation," only 17 percent attribute "great blame" to the United States. I am impressed that public opinion has rejected irresponsible accusations about unilateral American disarmament or about a failure of nerve in Iran.

Interpretation of opinion polls is tricky. But these polls reaffirm my belief that a democratic foreign policy is the best cure—and that hypochondriacs should not pose as physicians.

Senator George McGovern

* * *

The "American century" has been a product of America's economic and military strength, the resolve of its leadership and determination of its people. None of these factors is immutable and all have been buffeted in recent years.

It is my belief, however, that the most important of these factors, the will and determination of the American people, will continue to ensure that America's century is not ending.

I believe these polls show that the will to meet the challenges posed by a changing military balance is there; I believe they show the will to make the difficult decisions required to restore America's economic preeminence; and I believe they show the will to maintain America as a responsible world power, able to define its interests and defend those interests with courage and without apology.

I believe America can look forward to the twenty-first century confident in the strength of its institution and its ability to maintain its place in the world community. These polls indicate now, as they would twenty years hence, the alternative is simply unacceptable to the American people.

Senator Howard Baker

* * *

A nation's strength depends in large part on the collective willingness of its people to run prudent risks—both domestically and internationally. When the avoidance of military, political or economic risk dominates a nation's thinking, its relative decline is inevitable.

The polls, therefore, are a mixed bag. On the one hand, the American people clearly perceive the U.S. military decline vis à vis the Soviet Union and the need to correct the balance; on the other—although the trend lines are encouraging—the percent willing to take military risks to defend vital interests is still too low. And the number who want our foreign policy to advance American interests and values is even lower. (Ideologically, as well as militarily and economically, a good offense beats a good defense every time.)

Time is short. McGovernism, if no longer virulent, is by no means controlled and should we not soon conquer it, we shall all live in the "little America" he called for.

Laurence Silberman

Attorney, Former Ambassador
to Yugoslavia

* * *

These data triumphantly confirm the common sense of informed ordinary American citizens and their ability to grasp the root-truths of even the com-

plex, many-sided decline of U.S. influence in the world. Far more clearly than their supposed leaders in Washington, these citizens see the correlation between the sharply falling value of the inflation-rotted dollar and the parallel loss of American credibility abroad.

Their perception is sound because they realize that, for a generation after World War II, the United States successfully practiced a form of "dollar diplomacy" that enabled us to send money overseas in most instances to protect vital national interests through aid to allies, economic development, and promotion of expanded trade. As our dollar has weakened, we have been forced to send troops and weapons instead—and as Vietnam and Iran tragically illustrate, these are much less successful means of achieving our objectives.

The public's sense of priority is quite right: the best way to revive U.S. strength and influence abroad is to restore and maintain the value of the dollar.

Richard J. Whalen

Author and International
Business Consultant

* * *

The most recent polls seem to indicate that public sentiment in favor of a strong U.S. role in the world is on the rebound from Vietnam and its aftermath, which is not to say that Vietnam is behind us. Most of the questions involving "should" responses note an upturn toward internationalism. Missing from these responses, however, is some of the military interventionist enthusiasm associated with the good-old-bad-old days. In other words, there is a note of realism in this internationalist thrust; some would say a "new foreign policy realism" is emerging in the American public.

At the same time, however, when it comes to assessments of American power in world affairs, the slope seems generally to be downward in relation to the Soviet Union. This may also be realism, but it may be something else as well. Are the responses to questions on comparative international power between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. a reflection of a more general distrust of the com-


(Continued on page 41)



Americans and the World

PEOPLE WANT MORE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

Question: Do you feel that the United States ought to play a more important role as a world leader in the future than it now does, a less important role, or about as important a role as it does today?



	1974	1978
More important	33%	55%
Less important	21	14
As important	30	28
Not sure	16	3

Note: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (1974 and 1978) asked: "Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out?" For 1974, 66% said "better if we take an active part," 24% said "better if we stay out." For 1978, the figures were 59% and 29%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, November 13-December 1, 1978.

As international affairs have crowded into the headlines in recent months, public opinion survey firms have begun asking Americans a barrage of questions about U.S. foreign policy.

This section of Opinion Roundup brings together some of the fruits of that work in a special nine-page display, and the centerspread presents the views of other nations on U.S. and Soviet power. The major source of data here is a survey taken by the Gallup organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and published in March 1979. This is the second such in-depth survey by the Chicago Council; the first was conducted under its auspices by Louis Harris in 1974. Many of the charts shown here compare the answers from that earlier poll to those obtained this year.

Two caveats are in order. Nearly all of these polls were taken prior to President Carter's trip to the Middle East and the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The single exception is the Harris poll on page 29, which charts the rise in approval of Carter's handling of foreign policy after the peace treaty—along with his continued, low ratings on his handling of the economy. Other surveys conducted in the wake of the President's mission indicated that he had scored some gain in overall approval, but not as much as after the Camp David accords. It is still too early to tell whether the peace treaty has changed other views on foreign policy.

A second caveat is that the material displayed here does not address the intensity of feelings or the saliency of foreign policy in the public mind. As the magazine went to press (late March), it appeared that inflation and energy still preoccupy most Americans. There were indications, however, that for the first time since Vietnam, foreign policy issues were beginning to come front and center again. Thus, the polls shown here could provide the framework for a growing national debate over America's role in the world.


The Editors



What's Gone Wrong?

U.S. SEEN AS LESS IMPORTANT WORLD LEADER,

Question: Do you think the United States plays a more important and powerful role as a world leader today compared to ten years ago, a less important role, or about as important a role as a world leader as it did ten years ago?




Note: A recent survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, February 27-28, 1979, "Do you think the United States is more powerful, less powerful, or about as powerful a world leader today as it was 10 years ago?", shows that 20% believe the U.S. is more powerful, 56% less powerful, and 24% as powerful.

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

RESPECTED LESS ...


Question: Do you think that the United States is respected more in the world today than it was ten years ago, is respected less, or is respected about as much as it was ten years ago?



Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

AND FALLING BEHIND SOVIETS

Question: Do you think the United States has been falling behind the Soviet Union in power and influence in recent years?




Note: This study also measured public attentiveness to current foreign policy questions and belief about Soviet/U.S. standing. The "attentive public" was defined by the respondent's interest in five specific issues: Cuban military activities in Africa, problems in the Middle East, SALT talks, debate on the Panama Canal treaties, and congressional debates on foreign aid and by respondent's interest in reading about foreign affairs. Gallup found that the more attentive an individual was to foreign affairs, the stronger the belief that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union in power and influence.

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.



DOLLAR BLAMED FOR LOSS OF PRESTIGE

Question: (Hand card) Which of the reasons on this card is the most important reason for the decline in influence of the United States around the world. Just read off the number in front of your choice.




Note: Responses total more than 100 percent.

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

SITUATION IN IRAN SEEN AS VERY SERIOUS...


Question: As you know, the Shah of Iran has now left Iran. There is a real chance that the new government will soon be replaced by a government openly unfriendly to the United States. From the standpoint of the United States, how serious do you feel the situation in Iran is—very serious, only somewhat serious or hardly serious at all?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, January 17-22, 1979.

BUT NOT CARTER'S FAULT

Question: How much do you feel the Carter administration is to blame for Iran turning from a friend and ally of the United States to a neutral or even hostile country—a great deal, only some or hardly at all?



Note: In a subsequent ABC News/Harris poll (February 8-12, 1979), it was found that the public by a 52-30% margin placed the blame for the turmoil on the Shah for "running too repressive a regime in Iran."

Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, January 17-22, 1979.




OPINION ROUNDUP

What Should We Do?

GOALS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: IMPROVE LIFE IN U.S.A.

Question: I am going to read you a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all (read list).



Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.


THE DOLLAR FIX: CUT SPENDING AND RAISE TARIFFS

Question: Which if any of the things listed on this card would you be willing to do to help stop the decline of the dollar? (Hand card)

Question: Are there any things on this card that you would definitely oppose?

Note: Multiple responses per respondent.

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.






SUPPORT FOR MORE DEFENSE SPENDING AT AN 18-YEAR HIGH

Question: There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, too much or about the right amount? (March 1960-September 1974, January/February 1976-July 1977)

Question: Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense, keep it about the same, or cut back? (December 1974, November 1978)


	1960	1969	Feb. 1971	Sept. 1973	Sept. 1973	Dec. 1974	Sept. 1974	1976	1977	1978
Too much	18%	52%	49%	42%	46%	44%	32%	36%	23%	16%
About right	45	31	31	40	30	32	47	32	40	45
Too little	21	8	11	8	13	12	13	22	27	32



Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) March 1960-September 1974, January/February 1976, July 1977; Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 1974; American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

UNLEASH THE CIA...

Question: In general, do you feel that the CIA should or should not work inside other countries to try to strengthen those elements that serve the interests of the United States and to weaken those forces that work against the interests of the United States?




	Should	Should not	Don't know/Not sure
1974	43%	26%	31%
1978	59	21	20

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 1974; the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

... WITH ABOUT THE SAME RESTRICTIONS

Question: In your judgment, should the CIA be placed under greater restraint, should it have fewer restrictions than it does now, or should the restrictions remain the same?




Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.




OPINION ROUNDUP

INCREASING SUPPORT FOR SENDING TROOPS . . . IN SOME CASES



Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if: (read list)?



Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

Question: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel (read list) you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (1974)

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose use of U.S. troops if the Soviet Union invaded West Berlin? How about (read list)? (July 1978)

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if: (read list)? (November 1978)


	1974	July 1978	Nov. 17-26, 1978
Western Europe	39%	43%	54%
West Berlin	34	40	48
Yugoslavia	11	16	18
Taiwan	17	16	20
Israel	27	21	22

Note: Question wording differs. (See *Public Opinion*, January/February 1979, p. 34.)

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 6-14, 1974; Roper organization (Roper Reports 78-7), July 1978; American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

U.S. MAY HAVE TO SUPPORT SOME DICTATORS

Question: I am going to read some statements about international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. For each, tell me if you tend to agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly with the statement: The United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly toward us and opposed to the Communists.




Note: Support=agree strongly/somewhat, disagree=disagree strongly/somewhat.

Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.



SALT POLLS ARE POLES APART



Question: Do you favor or oppose the United States and Russia coming to an agreement to limit nuclear weapons? (CBS/NYT June 1978)

Question: Would you favor or oppose an agreement with Russia limiting military weapons? (CBS/NYT November 1978)

Question: Do you think the United States should or should not negotiate a treaty with the Russians to cut back military weapons? (CBS/NYT December 1978)

Question: Do you think the United States should or should not negotiate a treaty with the Russians to limit strategic military weapons? (CBS/NYT January 1979)

Question: Do you favor or oppose an agreement between the United States and Russia which would limit nuclear weapons? (NBC/AP)

Question: The U.S. and Russian negotiators have about reached agreement on a SALT treaty. The treaty which would last until 1985, limits each country to a maximum of 2,250 long-range nuclear missiles and bombers. As you know, there's a good deal of controversy about this proposed treaty. Do you think the U.S. Senate should vote for this new SALT treaty or against it? (Roper)

SALT Favor/Oppose	CBS/NYT	NBC/AP	Roper
June 1978	78% 14%	67% 22%	
August		71 22	
October		70 21	
October/November			42% 20%
November	65 28 *	71 17 *	
December	63 24	75 17	
January 1979	63 26		40 21
February		81 14	

LATE POLL: In March, the Committee on Present Danger, a Washington-based group that has expressed strong concerns about the SALT II treaty, released the results of its own study of public attitudes. The telephone poll was conducted by an independent survey firm, George Fine Research, Inc., among 1,211 respondents. Its responses on SALT II were as follows: "I strongly support SALT II," 8.3 percent; "SALT II is somewhat disappointing, but on balance, I would have to support it," 11.7 percent; "I would like to see more protection for the United States before I would be ready to support SALT II," 41.7%; "I strongly oppose the SALT II arms agreement with the Russians," 8.6%; "I don't know enough about the SALT II Treaty to have an opinion yet," 29.6%. There is a great deal of polling now underway on SALT II. In future issues, *Public Opinion* hopes to cover these results in detail.


*Sample size: CBS/NYT=14,000; NBC/AP=34,450 (Election day polls, 1978)

Note: Roper categories include: for, against, mixed feelings (volunteered), don't know; CBS/NYT and NBC/AP categories were favor/oppose, not sure/no opinion. The reader should be cautioned to note that different question wording affects responses.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/New York Times, latest that of January 23-26, 1979; NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of February 5-6, 1979; the Roper Organization (Roper Report 79-2), latest that of January 6-20, 1979.

HOW MUCH DO PEOPLE REALLY KNOW?

Question: Can you tell me which countries are involved in the SALT negotiations—the negotiations for a treaty that would limit strategic military weapons?




Note: No knowledge=no opinion.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, January 23-26, 1979.

PEOPLE SEE NO DEFENSE CUTS ...


Question: Do you think a treaty with the Soviet Union limiting weapons will or will not enable the United States to spend less money for defense?



Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, January 23-26, 1979.

... BUT GREATER SECURITY

Question: Do you think any such agreement limiting both sides' weapons would strengthen our national security or weaken it?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, February 5-6, 1979.




OPINION ROUNDUP

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question: I am going to read some statements about international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. For each, tell me if you tend to agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statement: The United States should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights.

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Don't know
1974	36%	32%	14%	7%	11%
1978	31	36	17	8	8




Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 1974; the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

MIXED VIEWS ON SOVIET TREATMENT

Question: I am going to read some statements about international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. For each, tell me if you tend to agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statement: How the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minority groups is a matter of internal Soviet politics and none of our business.

	Agree strongly	Agree somewhat	Disagree somewhat	Disagree strongly	Don't know
1974	15%	26%	27%	20%	12%
1978	21	29	24	18	8




Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, December 1974; the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

FOREIGN AID REMAINS UNPOPULAR

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we are spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount (read each item) ... foreign aid.


	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Too little	4%	3%	5%	3%	3%	4%
About right	20	17	17	18	24	24
Too much	70	76	73	75	66	67
Don't know	5	4	5	4	7	6



Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of 1978.

SLIM SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC AID ...


Question: On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations for the purposes of economic development and technical assistance?



Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.


... BUT STRONG OPPOSITION TO MILITARY AID

Question: On the whole, do you favor or oppose giving military aid to other nations? By military aid, I mean arms and equipment, but *not* troops.



Source: Survey by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 17-26, 1978.

OPINION ROUNDUP




CARTER APPROVAL RATINGS AS SEEN BY HARRIS

Question: How would you rate the job President Carter is doing as President—excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor?

Question: Now let me ask you about some specific things President Carter has done. How would you rate him on his

handling of the economy—excellent, pretty good, only fair or poor?

Question: How would you rate him on his handling of foreign policy?



Positive Ratings

	Overall	Economy	Foreign policy		Overall	Economy	Foreign policy
February 1977	52%			April (early)	33		
March	67			April (late)	30	22	29
April	69			May	37		
May	65	47%		June (early)	38		
June	61	44		June (mid)	32	21	25
July	59	41	48%	July	39	16	22
August	52	39		August	30	16	22
September	48	35	32	September	42	22	56
October	48	32	38	September	42		
November	46	33	38	October	43		
December	50	34	42	November (early)	46		
January 1978	47	28	43	November (late)	39	23	47
February	41	27	38	December	47	27	46
March	36			February	36	22	37
				March	31	16	45

Note: Positive=excellent and pretty good.

Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of March 22-27, 1979. **March survey taken after March 13 Mideast announcement from Cairo.**




U.S. Versus U.S.S.R.

PERCEPTIONS OF POWER

Question: Which statements on this card (respondents were handed a card with five statements) best describes how you would rate Russia's power in the world? And which statement best describes how you would today rate America's power in the world?

Most powerful




Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institutes, December 1978.


WILL U.S. POWER INCREASE OR DECLINE?

Question: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of 1979: A year when America will increase her power or a year when American power will decline? . . . A year when Russia will increase her power in the world or a year when Russian power will decline?

Power will increase




Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institutes, December 1978. *U.S. respondents were limited to increase and decline.



***Note:** Contrary to this Gallup survey, several other polls have recently shown that a plurality of Americans now believe the U.S.S.R. surpasses the U.S. in power. For example, an Opinion Research Corporation survey in February 1978 found that 20% of Americans thought the U.S. was stronger militarily than Russia, 34% the U.S. was weaker; a CBS/*New York Times* poll in June 1978 found that 12% said the U.S. was stronger militarily, 42%, the U.S.S.R. was stronger.



...As Others See It



		Most powerful	One of the most powerful	As powerful as other large countries			Increase	Decline	Same as 1978	Don't know
The U.S. view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	32% 10	56% 69	10% 15	The U.S. view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	53% 61	32% 19	* *	15% 20
The British view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	14 25	60 58	20 11	The West German view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	20 27	16 8	46% 46	18 19
The West German view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	20 20	65 66	11 11	The Dutch view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	24 32	14 6	57 55	5 7
The Dutch view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	20 9	53 62	22 22	The Japanese view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	18 32	18 5	38 34	26 29
The Japanese view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	20 9	55 60	10 14	The British view:	U.S. U.S.S.R.	31 48	23 8	33 27	13 17

Note: In no case did the total of the categories not shown here ("one of the least powerful," "not at all powerful," and "don't know"), exceed 17%.


*U.S. respondents were limited to increase and decline.

Religious Faith in America

LESS IMPORTANT IN PERSONAL LIFE

Question: How important would you say religion is in your own life—would you say very important, fairly important, or not very important?

	Very important	Fairly important	Not very important
1952	75%	20%	5%
1965	71	22	7
1978	53	33	14



Source: Surveys by Ben Gaffin and Associates for the Catholic Digest 1952; Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Catholic Digest 1965; Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition, April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

A NOTE TO READERS

Survey researchers are now giving a lot of attention to the status of organized religion and religious belief in the United States. The Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization conducted one very interesting study last year (on behalf of the Religious Coalition to Study Backgrounds, Values, and Interests of Unchurched Americans), and we have drawn heavily on this study in the pages that follow.

There have not been any massive changes in formal religious participation in the United States in recent years but the appeal of the churches has continued to weaken somewhat. Thus only four Americans in ten now state that they have attended church or synagogue in the last week—with a fairly sharp decline since the mid-1960s among Catholics—and just over one in four attend religious services at least weekly. A plurality of the public think religion is losing influence in American life. Fifty-three percent of the public told Gallup interviewers in 1978 that they considered religion "very important" in their own lives—down from 75 percent in 1952 and 70 percent in 1965.

At the same time, personal religious beliefs, and acceptance of many church doctrines or principles, seem exceptionally strong. Over 90 percent of Americans state

that they believe in God. More than 70 percent believe in life after death—including more than half of those who are not members of a church or synagogue or who have not attended religious services in the last six months. Eighty-five percent of the populace consider the Bible the word of God. Over 80 percent of Americans of Christian backgrounds state that they believe in the Resurrection of Christ. Some explanation of the gap between formal practice and private beliefs is provided by the finding that 81 percent of the population—including large majorities of all the major denominations—agree that "an individual should arrive at his or her own religious beliefs independent of any churches or synagogues." America is a nation of notably individualistic believers.

Protestants and Catholics take similar stands on a great variety of social and religious issues. And in underlying beliefs and values, Americans who participate in church life, and those who don't belong or do not attend, show a degree of similarity that is often striking. There is something of a convergence of values behind the denominational differences and those of formal religious practice.

—Everett C. Ladd, Jr.
Consulting Editor
Opinion Roundup


Note: In the following data, "churched" and "unchurched" respondents are indicated for several questions. "Unchurched" is defined in 1978 as a person who is not a member of a church or synagogue or who has not attended church or synagogue in the last six months, apart from weddings, funerals or special holidays such as Christmas,

Easter or Yom Kippur. "Churched" is defined as a person who is a member of a church or synagogue or who has attended church or synagogue in the last six months, apart from weddings, funerals or special holidays such as Christmas, Easter, or Yom Kippur.

OPINION ROUNDUP

... YET MANY SEE REVIVAL IN NATIONAL LIFE

Question: At the present time, do you think religion as a whole is increasing its influence on American life or losing its influence?




	Increasing	Losing	Same/No difference
1957	74%	15%	11%
1962	48	33	18
1965	36	49	14
1967	24	61	15
1969	15	74	12
1970	15	78	7
1974	33	59	8
1975	40	53	7
1976	45	46	8
1977	40	49	11

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of December 9-12, 1977.

CONFIDENCE IN THE CHURCH ...

Question: How much confidence do you, yourself, have in these American institutions? Would you say a great deal, quite a lot, some, very little, or none...? The church or organized religion.



Note: Based on respondents with an opinion, the rankings for Great deal/Quite a lot were: For Churched: 1. Church or organized religion (82%); 2. Banks and banking (60%); 3. Public schools and the military tied (52%); 4. Supreme Court (43%); 5. Big business (28%); 6. Television (22%); 7. Congress and labor unions tied (20%). For Unchurched: 1. Banks and banking (53%); 2. The military (47%); 3. Supreme Court (42%); 4. Public schools (41%); 5. Church or organized religion (39%); 6. Big business (31%); 7. Labor unions (28%); 8. Television (22%); 9. Congress (19%).


Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

IS IT FULFILLING ITS MISSION?

Question: Now I would like to read you fourteen statements. (Hand respondent card) Would you tell me after each whether you strongly agree, moderately agree, are uncertain, moderately disagree or strongly disagree.

Strongly/Moderately agree

Strongly/Moderately disagree




Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

OPINION ROUNDUP

RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE

Question: What is your religious preference—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, or Eastern Orthodox. If Protestant or other ask: What specific denomination or faith is that? (Hand respondent card)



Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

Specific Protestant Denomination

Southern Baptist Convention	8%
United Methodist Church	7%
Baptist/Don't know**	7%
Other Protestant	6%
Protestant unspecified	4%
Other Baptist	3%
Methodist/Don't know**	3%
United Church of Christ	3%
American Baptist Churches	3%
Episcopalian	2%
Lutheran/Don't know**	2%
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.	2%
Other religion	2%
American Lutheran Church	1%
Christian Church	1%
United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.	1%
Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints	1%
Lutheran Church in America	1%
Missouri Synod Lutheran Baptists	1%
Presbyterian/Don't know**	1%
Other Lutheran	1%
Other Presbyterian	*
Other Methodist	*
A.M.E. Zion Church	*
A.M.E. Church	*
National Baptist Convention of America	*
National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.	*


* = less than 1%

** = respondent did not know specific denomination

60%

CATHOLIC ATTENDANCE DROPPING

Question: Did you yourself happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days?



Did you happen to attend church in the last seven days?


	National	Catholic	Protestant
1954	47%	72%	40%
1958	49	74	44
1962	46	X	X
1966	44	68	38
1970	42	60	38
1974	40	55	37
1977	41	56	39
1978	41	52	40

Note: Gallup showed that 5% who did not attend church in the past week did participate in some religious activity such as Bible reading. (1976)
Question wording varied slightly over the year. "X" = not available. Figure for 1978 represents five surveys combined.

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of 1978.

FREQUENCY OF ATTENDANCE TODAY

Question: How often do you attend religious services?




Note: Surveys (Gallup) show that adults age eighteen to twenty-nine are less likely to attend than those age thirty and over. Attendance among women is consistently higher than men.

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1978.

OPINION ROUNDUP

THOSE WHO LEFT ...


Question: Has there been a period of two years or more when you did not attend church or synagogue, apart from weddings, funerals, or special holidays such as Christmas, Easter, or Yom Kippur?



Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

WHY SOME CAME BACK

Question: When you began attending again, what situation was most important in your decision to attend. (Asked of those who had had a period of two years or more when they did not attend.)




Note: Responses total more than 100%. Categories not shown are never attended (15%), getting older (1%), health returned (1%), other (2%).

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

... AND WHY THEY LEFT

Question: When you stopped attending, which of the statements on this card describe the reasons? Choose as many as apply. Just read off the letters. (Asked of those who have had a period of two years or more when they did not attend.)




Note: Total adds to more than 100% due to multiple responses. Categories not shown are: poor health (6%), another reason (17%), don't know/no answer (7%).

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

HOW IMPORTANT IS ATTENDANCE?


Question: Do you think a person can be a good Christian or Jew if he or she doesn't attend church or synagogue?




Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

I Believe

IN GOD . . .



IN LIFE AFTER DEATH . . .



In God . . .

Question: Do you believe in God or a universal spirit?


Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of 1976.

In life after death . . .


Question: Do you believe that there is life after death? (1978)

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

IN THE BIBLE . . .



IN JESUS CHRIST, SON OF GOD . . .



In the Bible . . .

Question: Which of the statements on this card comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? Just read off the letters. . . . The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word. The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral perceptions recorded by men.


Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

In Jesus Christ, Son of God . . .


Question: What do you believe about Jesus Christ—do you think Jesus Christ was God, another religious leader like Muhammed or Buddha, or do you think Jesus Christ never actually lived?

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

IN THE RESURRECTION . . .



. . . OF JESUS CHRIST



In the Resurrection . . .

Question: Do you believe in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, or not?

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

Of Jesus Christ

Question: Here's another kind of question about the Resurrection of Christ. (Respondents were handed a card) You notice that the numbers on this card go from zero meaning absolute certainty that Jesus Christ did *not* rise from the dead, up to ten, meaning absolute certainty that Jesus Christ *did* rise from the dead. To indicate how you feel, would you select a number between zero and ten, the lower the number the less certain you are that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, the higher the number the more certain you are.


Note: Absolutely certain he did rise = 10; less certain = 1-9; absolutely certain did not = 0.

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Born Again . . .

Question: Would you say that you have been born again, or have had a born again experience—that is, an identifiable turning point in your life?




Note: In August 1976, 35% indicated that they were born again in a similar Gallup question.

Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

. . . Or Into Zen

Question: The next question is about meditation. Do you practice any specific techniques of meditation such as those taught in Transcendental Meditation, Zen, Divine Light Mission or others?



Source: Surveys by Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.

HOW MANY MILLIONS?

Question: Which if any of these are you involved in or do you practice?

Religious Disciplines:	Per-cent	Projected devotees
Yoga	3%	5 million
Transcendental Meditation	2%	3 million
Eastern Religions	1%	2 million

Religious Movements:

Bible study groups	19%	29 million
Inner or spiritual healing	6%	9 million
Speaking in tongues	3%	5 million
Charismatic movement (Charismatic renewal)	2%	3 million

Source: Survey by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), January 20-23, 1978.

PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS: A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON MOST ISSUES

Question: Frequently on any controversial issue there is no clear-cut side that people take, and also frequently solutions on controversial issues are worked out by compromise. But I'm going to name some different things, and for each one would you tell me whether on balance you would be more in favor of it, or more opposed to it? . . . Legal abortions for those women who choose to have them? . . . School busing to achieve racial balance?

Source: Survey by Roper Organization (Roper Report 78-2) January 7-21, 1978.

Question: Now here are some statements about marriage, work, divorce, and so on. (Card shown respondent) Would you read each one and tell me whether on balance you tend to agree with it or disagree with it? . . . When a marriage has serious difficulties, divorce is an acceptable solution even where children are involved.


Source: Survey by Roper Organization (Roper Report 78-2) January 7-21, 1978.

Question: Now here are some statements about marriage, work, divorce, and so on. (Card shown respondent) Would you read each one and tell me whether on balance you tend to agree with it or disagree with it? There is no reason why a man and a woman shouldn't live together without being married if they choose to do so.

Source: Survey by Roper Organization (Roper Report 78-2) January 7-21, 1978.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between . . . (a) whites and nonwhites (b) Catholics and Protestants?

Source: Surveys by American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), latest that of July 21-24, 1978.



Religion At Home and Abroad

The most recent global survey of religious attitudes was conducted in 1975 by Gallup International under the sponsorship of the Charles F. Kettering Foundation. Afterwards, George Gallup issued a report summarizing the findings in this way:

The United States stands at the top of the industrialized societies in the importance religion plays in the lives of its citizens.

The findings from the global study, when compared with earlier surveys, show the level of belief and practice to have remained more or less constant among the American people, while something approaching a collapse of faith may be occurring in certain European and other nations of the world.


For example, the percentage of Americans who ex-

press a belief in a Supreme Deity has remained more or less constant over the last quarter century (since 1948), with 94 percent currently expressing such a belief. Over the same period of time, however, belief in God in Scandinavian countries has declined from 81 percent in 1968 to 65 percent. In West Germany, the percentage has declined from 81 percent in 1968 to 72 percent today. In Australia, the figure is down from 95 percent in 1948 to 80 percent in the last survey.

Belief in life after death has also remained fairly constant among Americans since 1948, but in Canada there has been a 34 percentage point drop over this period of time in the proportion who believe. In the Benelux nations a 20 percent point drop has occurred and in the Scandinavian countries a 26 percent point drop.

IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AT HOME AND ABROAD

Question: How important to you are your religious beliefs—very important, fairly important, not too important, or not at all important?



	Very important	Fairly important	Not too important	Not at all important	Don't know
United States	58%	30%	7%	5%	2%
Italy	36	42	16	6	*
Canada	36	36	19	9	*
Benelux	26	30	22	19	3
Australia	25	33	29	13	*

	Very important	Fairly important	Not too important	Not at all important	Don't know
United Kingdom	23	26	26	20	5
France	22	33	23	20	2
West Germany	17	30	37	14	2
Scandinavia	17	28	39	13	3

*Less than one percent.

Note: For India, 86% thought their religious beliefs were very important. For Japan, the figure was 14%.


Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institute for Charles F. Kettering Foundation 1974-1975 for foreign; American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), January 1978 for U.S.A.

OPINION ROUNDUP

BELIEF IN GOD ...

Question: Do you believe in God or a universal spirit?

Believe in god




Note: For India, 99% indicated belief in God or universal spirit. For Japan, the figure was 44%.

Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institute for Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 1974-1975 for foreign; American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), January 1978 for U.S.A.

AND LIFE AFTER DEATH

Question: Do you believe in life after death? Do you believe that there is life after death? (1978)

Believe in life after death




Note: For India, 76% indicated belief in life after death. For Japan, the figure was 18%.

Source: Surveys by Gallup International Research Institute for Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 1974-1975 for foreign; Princeton Religion Research Center and the Gallup Organization, Inc., for the Religious Coalition April 14-17, 1978 and April 28-May 1, 1978.


Concern About Cancer

CANCER SEEN INCREASING

Question: Do you think the amount of cancer in society is increasing, remaining the same or decreasing?




Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, Inc., for Shell Oil Company, April 1978.



Note: For additional polls on the contemporary scene, please see the article on page 49, "New Hampshire: The Countdown Begins," which contains the results of a special survey commissioned by *Public Opinion*.

AT HOME: LET PEOPLE DECIDE


Question: Some people say that when a substance may cause cancer—such as cigarettes or saccharin—and people are fully informed about it, they should be allowed to make their own decisions whether to run the risk of getting cancer or not. Other people say the government should ban all substances that might cause cancer. Which is closer to your view?



Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, Inc., for Shell Oil Company, April 1978.

IN THE WORKPLACE: ACTION WANTED

Question: If the public policy of eliminating cancer risks caused some factories to close down and increased unemployment in the country, would you favor or oppose this goal?



Source: Survey by Cambridge Reports, Inc., for Shell Oil Company, April 1978.

(Continued from page 20)

petency of our leaders and institutions? Such distrust is found in other polls relating to domestic policy. Is the message coming through that, as a people, we are regaining some of our enthusiasm for international involvement, but we are somewhat at a loss about how to fulfill our interests? Another way of putting this is as follows: we believe in ourselves but not necessarily in our leaders.

I do not think widespread agnosticism about our institutional capabilities is entirely unhealthy, but carried to extremes the slopes in the polls could become quite divergent, with idealism way up and faith in capability way down. As we look beyond 1979, this disparity may lead to some serious problems for the political system, not the least being a kind of perpetual restlessness in public attitudes toward its leadership with very destabilizing results for incumbents: the one-term presidency, more startling shifts in Congress, and so on. I should think the leadership of both political parties would be quite concerned about this and would want to narrow any emerging gap between public expectations and public assessments in foreign policy.

Robert Pranger
*American Enterprise Institute
Director of Foreign and
Defense Policy Studies*

* * *

This polling data and other recent public opinion surveys should provide plenty of ammunition for everyone in the current debates over American foreign policy.

That's right—everyone. Because—depending on which questions are asked and how they are phrased—the results of surveys can appear to support varying positions.

Take national defense spending. Conservatives will argue that the polls show a clear plurality for those who favor increased defense spending. But liberals will point to polls showing that even greater pluralities support increased spending for education, health care, and other domestic needs.

Take support for U.S. allies. Conservatives will note that 59 percent of the public believes the CIA should work in other countries. But liberals will note that 58 percent opposes the United

States providing military assistance to other nations, even when such assistance specifically excludes American troops.

Take American influence in the world. Conservatives will point out that a plurality of the public, 44 percent, believes we are less important and powerful than ten years ago. But liberals can respond that 40 percent more people blame this decline on political corruption in the United States than on the growing military power of the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that national leaders should use the polls to determine how to communicate with and educate the public, but should not rely on them for serious guidance in formulating foreign policy. The public appears to have a basic sense of when things are working well and when they aren't (despite the recent CBS Survey, in which two-thirds of the public said foreign policy has no effect on how they vote)—and, I believe, acts accordingly on election day.

Alan Baron
*Editor, Political Newsletter
(The Baron Report)*

* * *

The important decision which faces Americans in 1979 is not simply whether the United States must become more assertive in foreign policy and stronger in defense preparedness. That we assume. Equally critical, or perhaps more so, is the motivation and policy goal(s) around which American global reassertiveness is built.

In that regard, the poll data presented from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations' late 1978 special Gallup survey are especially noteworthy. What they say, in a nutshell, is that while the American people pay lip service to what I would call neo-Woodrow Wilsonianism (global do-gooding, preoccupation with human rights) in the *abstract*, they give it a relatively low priority in *concrete* situations.

Asked to rate the importance of a dozen possible foreign policy goals, the Chicago/Gallup sample gave overwhelming first priority to three critical aspects of national economic *self-interest*—protecting the dollar, safeguarding energy supplies and preserving U.S. jobs (presumably via trade policy). More than three-quarters of the sample rated each of these as "very important."

By contrast, the four goals given the *least* priority were the altruistic abstractions—protecting human rights, aiding Third World development, promoting democracy, and the like. Interestingly, 64 percent thought it was very important to stop the spread of world communism, many more than worried about neo-Wilsonianism. The anti-communist category, too, lagged behind the idea that economic self-interest should be the key concern of U.S. foreign policy.

In short, what I am suggesting is that the people, as usual, are ahead of the policy elites. The United States has indeed suffered a major erosion of global power and credibility, which must be rebuilt to the maximum extent possible. However, the great era of American power so clearly being over, the rebuilding and reassertion of the 1980s must be dovetailed with self-interest and not dissipated in any global ideological crusade or naive international morality binge.

Kevin P. Phillips
*Editor, Political Newsletter
(The American Political Report)*

* * *

The evidence from the 1978 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey reveals a heightened sense of self-interest permeating the foreign policy concerns of the American public. This seems to be motivated by increased economic and military insecurity, as evidenced by the public's anxiety over the value of the dollar and Soviet military power.

On the security side, the Soviet Union has replaced Vietnam as the central preoccupation of American foreign policy. We are not, however, experiencing a return to the cold war. Although the containment of communism is seen as an important goal of American foreign policy, it has receded in priority compared to the cold war years.

A more limited role is envisaged for the United States in the foreign policy arena. This is accompanied by a reluctance to commit U.S. troops in crisis situations in many parts of the world. The notable exceptions are Western Europe, Japan, and U.S. neighbors.

John Reilly
*President, Chicago Council
on Foreign Relations
(Excerpted from Council report)*

☐



by Michael J. Robinson

PRIME TIME CHIC: Between Newsbreaks and Commercials, the Values are L.A. Liberal

For the past two years, the Lawrences have been living very sexy lives. The Lawrences are the family in "Family," one of the few television programs on ABC that has been consistently popular with the critics as well as the public.

Popularity isn't the only thing consistent about "Family." So is sex—not just "cutesy-poo," play sex that traditionally comes over prime time, but serious, adult sex.

Howard Rosenberg, TV critic of the *Los Angeles Times*, kept a record and found that during their first eighteen months on ABC, four of the five Lawrences had some sort of pre-, post-, or extra-marital tangle.

Brother Willie, twenty-one, had an affair with a married woman.

Sister Nancy, twenty-seven, had three lovers—one of whom was her former husband.

Sister Buddy, sixteen, had a homosexual teacher and a steady boyfriend who tried to change Buddy into a woman (and barely missed).

Father Doug admitted to one past "indiscretion," and almost committed a very contemporary second.

Five of this season's first eleven episodes on "Family" had serious sex as the theme. So far, only Mother Kate has managed to stay within the confines of marriage, and nobody is making any promises about her.

If illicit sex was conspicuously present in "Family" during the fall season, guilt was just as conspicuously absent. And almost all of this season's original hits, including "Taxi," "Just Friends," and "Fantasy Island," followed the same pattern—lots of sex, very little remorse.

With few exceptions, prime time has become a plug for sexual openness and freedom. But the plug doesn't stop there. Entertainment television serves as a soft-core, progressive statement about love, marriage, drugs, blacks, women, and gays. Between the news breaks and the commercials, the values on prime-time television

are consistently liberal chic.

Programs like "Laverne and Shirley" can dilute but can't neutralize what has developed into a schedule of socially hedonistic, superficially liberal shows.

This season's top twenty contains both kinds of liberal chic—the political and the social. We still watch "M.A.S.H.," a show that satirizes war, the military, U.S. foreign policy, and "All in the Family," the Norman Lear production that made liberal chic legitimate on TV, even in its most blatant political theme.

A good percentage of the newer shows in the top twenty this season are less political, but are every bit as socially liberal as the last generation of programming—shows like "One Day at a Time" that paint life as a socio-sexual odyssey in which mothers and daughters discuss their intimate lives as if they were the weather. Or shows like "Soap" that treat WASP values and behavior as if they were diseases. Shows like "What's Happening" in which blacks act like whites, only better. Or shows like "Three's Company"—last fall's highest rated show—which regards multiple cohabitation as the preferred living arrangement and implies that group sex isn't so much immoral as confusing.

Politically liberal prime time started with the "Smothers Brothers" and ended, more or less, with "Maude." But the social liberalism of "Laugh-In" remains very much alive. The only programs that are willing (dare?) to offer traditional social values are the *nostalgia* shows like "The Waltons," "Happy Days" or "Little House on the Prairie." Contemporary settings almost always mean liberal chic on network television.

While the era of "All in the Family" may be fading, the Lear revolution has been preserved by painting hookers, housewives, and homosexuals as heroes, junkies as misunderstood kids, and blacks, Indians, and Puerto Ricans as the noblest of all Americans. In the new TV world, bad guys are white, suburban, thirtyish, and straight.

But what can we expect to be the implications of all this? After ten years of prime-time chic, we may finally be seeing some results "out there"—not just in the corporate board rooms and suburban bedrooms, where women, blacks, and gays are asserting themselves in all manner of ways—but in the polls, where more and more Americans are accepting the unconventional, progressive or liberal social behavior that people in prime time either practice or condone. So, although my own values *support* gay rights, feminism, integration, and sexual freedom, I think it's time for admission and recognition by liberals like me, and everybody else, that prime-time chic exists—and that it matters.

A Shift to the Right . . . And the Left?

People don't admit to being liberal anymore. Between 1963 and 1976, the portion of the public labeling itself "liberal" fell from 49 percent to 26 percent. Between 1964 and 1974, the percentage of people who preferred membership in a conservative party jumped from 49 to 57. In November's elections, the Republicans picked up seats in *both* the House and the Senate—the first time they've done that since 1966. Liberals like Udall run as progressive and Jerry Brown is preaching the political economy of Calvin Coolidge.

But the same public which began shifting to the right *politically* in the late sixties has been shifting to the left *socially* since about the same time and at about the same rate. The Gallup poll and Harris poll find that between 1969 and 1977—

- The portion of the public regarding premarital sex as "not at all wrong" increased 16 percent.

- The portion believing that an abortion decision should be left up to a woman and her doctor increased by 13 percent. By 1978 less than 20 percent of the population believed abortions should be illegal in all circumstances.

- The portion regarding marijuana as "a serious problem" decreased by 19 percent.

- The portion admitting to having tried marijuana increased by a factor of six!

The country has even mellowed about gay rights over the last five years. According to last June's Gallup poll, a clear majority—56 percent—now thinks that homosexuals deserve equality in job opportunities. Anita Bryant has not spoken for a silent majority.

Race relations follow the same pattern. The percentage approving of interracial marriage—in theory at least—has almost doubled since 1968. The percentage willing to vote for a qualified black as president has more than doubled in the last twenty years. As of summer 1978, 77 percent of the white population said that they would support a qualified black.

TV Is Divided Into Two Parts

One thing that could help explain why the country has been moving in two directions at once is television. At

the networks, television comes in two basic styles—news and entertainment. Although news and entertainment often look alike, they make for different kinds of effects.

Despite the brouhaha about elitist, liberal commentators controlling the airwaves, a good case can be made for believing that over the past decade and a half network news has been helping to move national opinion toward political conservatism.

With its unique audience and with a unique penchant for the sensational, the bizarre, and the negative—especially when it comes to scandals and snafus in Washington—network journalism has played a role in undermining public confidence in national governments, New Deal-style or otherwise.

Tying forty million nightly viewers to the day's most "newsworthy" film clips—as networks define newsworthy—would produce public frustration with almost any imaginable administration or set of policies, and has since 1963. My own research shows that people who depend upon TV news for following current events are more hostile toward the national government and more alienated from politics than people who don't. In addition, people who were most hooked on network news back in the late sixties were also more committed to George Wallace, psychologically and at the polls, than anybody else in the electorate.

Of course, Watts, Vietnam, Watergate, and stagflation were real events as well as media events. None of them made big government look like the bargain that the Roosevelt generation had led us to expect. The about-face of the political right can thus be seen as part medium, part message—and not very surprising.

What is surprising has been the continuing drift in the other direction—toward social liberalism.

Fingering entertainment television as the cause of any social phenomenon—good or bad—has developed into a new form of national pastime. But in this instance, a little fingering is probably deserved. One can make at least as strong a case for arguing that prime time has helped to shift the public toward the "social left" as for arguing that news time has moved us the other way. In fact, the case for prime-time liberalism is easier. Arguing that TV news causes conservative opinion requires subtlety, if not a little intellectual sleight of hand. Arguing that prime time causes social liberalism is very direct.

What's On TV?

We can start with the content. Prime time has been pushing liberal social themes since just after the free speech movement began at Berkeley. Some prime-time critics feel that entertainment television still lacks any sort of solid, liberal credentials. Muriel Cantor, Professor of Communications at American University and long-time analyst of television production, says that despite the new image of prime time, "TV is one of the most conservative of media—an instrument of social

control . . . themes which appear to be liberal are really cover-ups." And Cantor is hardly alone in painting prime time as a lesson in corporate state values.

But a growing number of critics think that prime time is socially liberal—especially compared with its former shadow self.

Much of the griping about prime-time liberalism comes from the fundamentalist, Christian right wing—groups that send out packets on how to monitor TV programs for indecency or how to get the FCC to stop licensing licentious broadcasters. But social scientists also find that television has plenty of "progressive" social values built into it and that the trend may be getting stronger. The clearest example, as any fundamentalist will tell you, is sex.

Nobody in his right mind could argue that television is hard-core. Sex never happens on serial TV. It has *just* happened or is *about* to happen. But prime time is heavily sex-oriented and getting more so, as producers challenge the censors and, more importantly, as the network themselves try to compensate viewers for recent cutbacks in violence.

Television loves sex—especially sex between consenting adults who happen *not* to be married to each other. The Summer, 1978 edition of the *Journal of Communication*, perhaps the most distinguished of the scholarly journals that trace popular culture and the media, contains an article that analyzes fifty-eight hours of entertainment TV—one episode from each prime time and Saturday morning dramatic series from the 1976-77 season. In their research, the four authors (Collado, Greenberg, Korzenny, and Atkin) counted and found (actual or implied) "five instances of homosexual or heterosexual rape, seven instances of homosexual acts, twenty-eight instances of prostitution, forty-one instances of sexual intercourse ('unmarried'), and only six instances of sexual intercourse between 'marriage partners.'" Unmarried triumphed over married sex almost seven to one! A second study just completed by Eli Rubinstein at Stony Brook indicates that the level of sexual innuendo in prime time increased by a factor of five between 1975 and 1977.

Neither study makes clear whether all this sex is pictured positively or negatively. But with unmarried sex outdistancing married sex seven-to-one in prime time, network TV can hardly be criticized for reflecting traditional sexual values, although it might be attacked for reflecting contemporary reality.

Of course, prime time rarely takes a dim view of sexuality in any of its hybrid forms. The pilot for ABC's new crime show, "Vega\$, " turns a teenage hooker into a heroine. In the pilot for "Flying High," CBS's less than adequate answer to "Charlie's Angels," all three female leads, playing stewardesses, try to have sex with the same man—the very unlikely Jim Hutton. As the plot developed, Hutton would have had them all (and they him) except he fell asleep with bachelorette number one and got too sunburned to be touched by

bachelorette number two. The end of the show was vintage prime-time chic. The one stewardess (Kathryn Witt) who made the Hutton connection gets applause—not chastisement—from her roommates along with all the flight passengers after they finally figure out what Witt and Hutton have been up to.

Even the straightest of shows practices the same permissive sex. "Love Boat," television's version of Noah's Ark, in which ABC brings on board one of every stereotypic species known to situation comedy, moves back and forth between old-fashioned and new-style permissiveness. "Love Boat's" captain, Gavin MacLeod—the same guy who played hopelessly straight Murray on the old "Mary Tyler Moore Show"—now supports mature, open sexuality among consenting, passenger adults, including himself.

On one show last season MacLeod welcomed aboard a divorced high school crush of thirty years earlier, played by Jessica Walter. MacLeod wooed her until she seduced him. As "Love Boat" reaches its destination, Walter tells the captain that it's been great, but now it's over. In a classic, made-for-modern-TV, sex-role reversal, woman tells man that she's going back to her career and that captains aren't supposed to abandon ship after every affair. It's prime time's vapid version of Bergman telling Bogart what to do—to wise up and get on the plane.

Women of Prime Time

Prime time isn't just sexually progressive—some programs work almost harder at being socially liberal than being libertine. For instance, feminism has been doing much better on prime time than feminist-oriented critics ever admit.

The "Mary Tyler Moore Show" became an ironic target for organized feminist criticism two years ago when the U.S. Civil Rights Commission published its first edition of *Window Dressing on the Set: Women and Minorities in Television*. The Commission report criticized Mary Tyler Moore for calling her boss "Mr. Grant" even though everyone else calls him "Lou," an egregious act that the Commission considered a sign that women on TV "still tend to be subordinate to men in their lives."

But most critics saw Mary Richards—Moore's *nomme de tube*—as a proto-feminist, at the very least. As a single, sexually interested TV producer, Richards was more independent and professional than most mid-thirties American women—and so was Rhoda—and so were all the MTM female leads that spun off from Mary Tyler Moore.

In fact, between 1969 and 1974, 15 percent of the prime-time white females played roles as professional women, according to the very same Rights Commission study that tried to crucify the networks for their continuous sexist programming. That figure of 15 percent not only overstated the percent of professional women "out there," it was greater than the figure for profes-

sional black males on TV and wasn't all that far behind the percent for white males.

Judging from the newest edition of *Window Dressing*, published this January, one has to wonder as much about the objectivity of the Commission as the alleged insensitivity of the networks to women. The Commission's own "Update" shows that women are not only doing better on TV but have caught up with men in some important dimensions. Comparing the 1975-1977 performances to 1969-1974, Commission records show that the number of white women depicted in prime time as "professional" had risen to 18 percent, while for white men, the number had fallen to 19 percent. Seven of this season's Top Twenty shows have female leads, and in the new genre of prime time, most of the female leads are smarter and more independent than many of the males. Charlie's "angels"—favorite targets of both Christian and feminist critics—forsake their own dates, à la James Bond, week by week to solve crimes committed by men that the angels always manage to outsmart. Even Laverne and Shirley, who get hung in effigy by critics of all shapes and descriptions, depend on each other, not on their men. Their two male friends, Lenny and Squiggy, play Lucy and Ethel, while Shirley and Laverne really play Ricky and

Fred—dumb, but less dumb.

It's hard to make a case for liberated commercials. Ads are the last real frontier for TV's once unrelenting sexist values. Between 1970 and 1976, according to William and Karen O'Donnell, the percentage of women in commercials pictured in the home stayed about the same—80 percent! It's almost as if the industry is willing to gamble with feminism in entertainment but less willing to take a gamble on the really important stuff—the ads.

Blacks Are Oreos

Pseudo progressive values and images extend to race issues, too.

Television treats race relations "liberally," not only by producing more black-oriented programs year by year, but also by removing blacks from criminal roles or unflattering roles of any type.

Joe Dominick, Professor of Journalism at the University of Georgia, identified this tendency for prime time to pour bleach on all the bad guys and have them turn out whiter than white in an article he wrote for *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1973. Dominick's analysis showed that only 7 percent of the prime-time criminals were black. FBI statistics from that year indicate that



Ed Gamble/Register & Tribune Syndicate

blacks accounted for 30 percent of the criminal arrests.

As early as 1970, communications research was discovering that on network television about half of all blacks were portrayed upper middle class and that trend hasn't really abated. The new routine, however, is to put blacks in black settings and have them behave like the better part of the bourgeoisie.

Perhaps the most telling development in black prime time is Norman Lear's recent attempt to do a new series this spring about a black male who serves as a member of the House of Representatives. The plot was built, in part, around the congressman's foolish antics with his staff. The point was apparently to poke fun at a less than competent congressman who *happened* to be black. At first, it seemed like another breakthrough for Lear, but it wasn't to be. As of last month, the word was that under pressure from black members of Congress, who allegedly threatened to sponsor legislation to control some phases of broadcasting, CBS and Lear dropped the show. Prime-time chic and politics mean that, for some time to come, only white males will play frivolous politicians.

Gays Are Victims

Last season's favorite prime-time sop was clearly the misunderstood, harassed homosexual—always white (black gayness is still a bit too much for TV), always professional, and always the innocent victim.

On "Family," last year's theme homosexual was Buddy's teacher, who in the course of the show loses Buddy's respect, since the community bigots have maliciously publicized the fact that she, the teacher, is a lesbian. In the end, the community and Buddy accept the teacher for what she is—a great teacher—and beat down the red-neck styled element who try to have her fired.

On "Starsky and Hutch," the obligatory pro-gay program involved a police detective who gets murdered and is then discovered to have been a closet homosexual. He was, however, also a great cop and a close friend of both Starsky and Hutch, who, by show's end, find the killer (not gay) and express their newfound empathy for the plight of homosexuals. Gay is not beautiful on prime time—but since the early seventies it has never been ugly or sinister, let alone evil.

Networks aren't (can't be) as liberal as other media and progressive themes in prime time usually do fade out by the end of the show when traditional values make a minor comeback. On CBS's "One Day at a Time," last summer's number one rated series, Julie, an eighteen-year-old daughter of Ann Romano, moves in with her boyfriend. Mom loses the fight to bring Julie home—but only for the first half of the episode. Julie eventually comes home intact—and before consummating her lease or her relationship. But traditional? Mom and Julie treat the whole thing as a casual lesson learned—no remorse, no recrimination, no "I told you so." To national audiences that may well come across more as, "living with my boyfriend isn't for me, but it's

okay for somebody else"—the essence of TV's social liberalism and what the polls show as a continuing acceptance of other people's lifestyles.

The real criticism that applies from both left and right is that prime-time programming is underdeveloped, vapid and plastic—not that it's traditional. Pseudo-liberal, yes; traditional, no. Radical, never.

Sit-Com's the Thing

Things weren't always so liberal on prime time; just think back to Desi and Lucy and Ralph and Alice. The evolution began with the "Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour," continued through "Laugh In," and came of age with "All in the Family." All comedies.

There's no accident to the fact that comedy has led the way toward liberal chic. Comedy has always been important to the networks, not only because comedy excuses so much but because it also sells. CBS used comedy to replace NBC as the number one network back in the fifties. Three seasons back, ABC used comedy, especially situation comedy, to strip CBS of its leadership.

But sit-com may be as important to sociology as it is to the networks. Next to soap opera, sit-com is the most value-packed kind of programming there is. Sit-coms sell values because they don't have much else to sell—no variety, no action, no violence, no suspense. Programs are based on a situation that day-to-day social values have somehow made comic.

A second reason that sit-coms have led the way toward liberal chic is that they have become the very heart of prime time. The Nielsen "Top Ten" list for the last twenty-five years makes the growing importance of situation comedy perfectly clear. In 1956 only two of the top ten shows were situation comedies—"I Love Lucy" and "December Bride." In 1966 there were six sit-coms in the top ten—"Andy Griffith," "The Lucy Show," "Green Acres," "Bewitched," "The Beverly Hillbillies," and "Gomer Pyle USMC." Last season produced a record-tying eight: "Laverne and Shirley," "Happy Days," "Three's Company," "M.A.S.H.," "One Day at a Time," "All in the Family," "Soap," and "Alice." The qualitative differences aren't as great as the quantitative. But compare "One Day at a Time" with "December Bride," or "Three's Company" with "Andy Griffith," or "Soap" with anything.

The only type of programming that even approaches sit-com as a purveyor of social values is soap opera. But soaps are "serious"—they have to meet tougher standards of censorship. On soaps, people who break any of the commandments have to pay—either in guilt, divorce, miscarriage, or impotence. By comparison, sit-com characters get away with murder—or at least promiscuity.

Besides an ability to slip past the censor, sit-coms have other characteristics that make them especially important to anybody trying to explain TV's effects. Popular sit-com characters, who appear every week,

who rarely threaten anybody's ego, who lay their own values down gently and humorously on the coffee table and walk away, have a unique potential for affecting their audiences.

If the viewer doesn't like the values being offered he or she can dismiss them as merely satirical or humorous (as liberals do with Archie Bunker). If the viewer agrees with the values, everything is fine.

As for the bulk of viewers in the middle, or the viewers not-too-sensitive about social issues generally, the values of situation comedy may eventually become part of their own. More likely, the program's values will lead those viewers to think that if decent people like Mary Richards (McKinney now) act that way, that's probably a legitimate way to behave. Either way—whether the viewer actually adopts liberal chic values or just accepts their legitimacy—that attitude looks like liberalism in the polls.

Why Liberal Chic?

Nobody denies that television production people are socially liberal. Although Muriel Cantor challenges the premise that programs are really liberal, she is convinced that the writers, actors, and producers are.

Cantor, whose 1969 Ph.D. thesis at UCLA was a sociological analysis of television producers, says that producers and writers are not only Democratic and liberal, they are also Jewish, urban, and from one coast or the other. (Spiro Agnew, where are you?)

Ben Stein, author of a new and controversial book, *The View from Sunset Boulevard* (a work he foreshadowed in his article in *Public Opinion* in August/September 1978), thinks that TV production, based almost totally in Los Angeles, reflects Hollywood more than personal, deep-seated liberal philosophy. While Stein acknowledges that the values of these people are socially progressive, he sees their liberalism only going so far. "Their values are permissive," says Stein, "but their own personal lives are clean cut." "There was more sex in the White House than out here in Norman Lear's company," a charge made even more remarkable by the fact that Stein worked in Richard Nixon's White House. (Stein is the only man in history who will have worked for both Richard Nixon and Norman Lear.)

But the real fight is not over just how liberal the producers and writers are—everyone agrees they are more liberal than their average viewers; the debate is whether they stick their own values into their programs. As expected, critics on the left say no; critics on the right say definitely.

Cantor, who labels herself "pretty radical," thinks that the TV people "clearly are not espousing their own values" when they produce their shows and that the liberals who worked in television during the early seventies couldn't take it any more and have since left. But Stein, a thinking man's conservative, ridicules what he considers a ludicrous theory—that television people

don't bring their own social values to their work with them. And there are some leftist critics who agree with him. Jerry Mander, whose new book, *Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television*, takes a position almost as radical as its title, writes that the "Movement people of the 1960s who were not willing to go to terrorism began dropping out, moving to farms in Vermont or Oregon. Or, and I know many who have done this, they got jobs writing television serials. They justified this with the explanation that they were still reaching the people with an occasional revolutionary message, fitted ingeniously into the dialogue."

All serious analysts of television realize that prime time doesn't merely reflect the social values of L.A. producers, or New York executives, or even advertisers. Ratings, affiliates, the FCC, the NAM—all help shape the content. Values are just part of programming.

But some TV analysts see programming as much a case study in social engineering as anything else—a sort of values conspiracy theory. One network executive, a liberal working in audience research in New York, told me that he thinks L.A. production houses, as well as the corporate executives back in New York, figure out how far they can go by using the Midwest—the nation's most traditional region outside the South—as their least common denominator. According to his theory, programs present themes that are acceptable to television production people until the networks or the producers decide that the show won't play in Peoria—a new role for Richard Nixon's favorite barometer.

Is Anybody Out There Listening?

Nobody is certain about the effects of prime time, and some social scientists argue that entertainment television has no impact at all on social values. Some research even makes a case for prime-time television as a *conservatizing* influence. Russell Weigel and Richard Jessor, two behavioral psychologists from the University of Colorado, claim to have found a link between TV watching and conventional attitudes about religion, drugs, politics, and personal freedom. But most of their work was done in 1970, before the industry turned around. George Gerbner, Director of the Annenberg School of Communications in Philadelphia, also finds that watching television and worrying about crime go very much in hand—that "crime-time" television has made Americans more suspicious of each other and more neurotic about the society they share. The end product of all that is, as Gerbner sees it, more support for governmental crackdowns—in short, more conservatism.

But the fact is there isn't much conclusive evidence one way or the other about prime time. Most of the academic studies have been anything but exciting—discovering, for example, that people who consider "All in the Family" to be funny are more likely to watch it. Part of the analytical problem involves finding an acceptable technique for proving that TV per se,

actually *causes* something. But beyond that, the problem too has been a lack of real interest. The best talent in the academy has been out studying the impact of prime time on violent behavior, not on attitudes toward sex, drugs, or women's issues. While violence research has been getting funding, values research has been getting the crumbs.

Most of the work done on violence, especially the mammoth *Surgeon General's Report*, argues that TV causes aggression, especially among young people. It seems apparent that if violent programming can cause violence, liberal programming should be able to "cause" liberalism. In fact, because many social scientists think that it is easier to influence attitudes than behavior, the impact of TV on attitudes should be greater than on aggression.

Critics who doubt the impact of entertainment television stress the chicken-and-the-egg problem, arguing that it's impossible to tell what's causing what. Or, alternatively, they argue that television always follows social change and never leads it. While the first argument is hard to dismiss, the second one isn't. Themes on prime time do follow a leader, but the leader in expressed or implied values isn't the public as much as most critics think. Dominant values in much prime-time television, and changes in those dominant values, don't come from the heartland. From civil rights to disco, social movements start in places like New York and L.A., and the media move them out to the boonies. Television gets much of its values and themes from other, classier media (books, and especially magazines), and, to a lesser degree, from an urban-based intelligentsia. Television edits those messages, obviously, before it passes them along as TV chic. But by touching millions, instead of thousands, prime time becomes a highly visible, national, and immediate cause of changing social norms. TV may not be a first cause, but it is a highly apparent one.

Prime time helps to make the social values of the coastline elites the social values of the nation. For decades, prime-time social values have been making us less regional and less heterogeneous. But until the late sixties, that meant national taste in clothes, music, dancing, or accent. With television moving into more serious social themes, the effect is on values, not just tastes. Thus, we find the nation moving into the Global Village that Marshall McLuhan named and predicted—with television in the role of a tribal medicine man who takes his cues from the higher circles but makes the messages palatable, acceptable and enjoyable to the rest of the villagers.

This is not to argue that prime time has single-handedly transformed social values in America. Television reflects and magnifies change as well as produces it. Moreover, there are at least two alternative interpretations that help to explain the growth of social liberalism, both of which are based in demography. One interpretation stems from the accepted fact that the

"young" have socially progressive opinions, the other from the more recent view that the "educated" also have such views. Thus, so the theories go, as the country has grown younger and better educated, it has also grown more socially liberal.

But ignoring television as a factor in social liberalism seems foolish. Prime time has so many qualities that make for effective social learning—vast audiences, close involvement between actors and viewers, programs that center around relevant social relationships and social issues. Theoretically, prime time has more going for it as a teaching device than most college classes, which often go without audience, involvement, or relevance. All that the shows lack is a grading system. As long as prime time continues to be progressive—compared to Cincinnati, not to Sausalito—the lessons should continue to stick.

What Next?

Progressive prime time isn't inevitable. In the fifties television was anything but progressive—and it was much more likely to reflect than mold national folkways or attitudes.

It's doubtful that anything could return television to that wretched state, but it is conceivable that prime time could find a different set of social values to build into its programs. One way would be through pressure.

The newest thing in television is the growth of increasingly powerful organizations that try to change something about network programming that the organizations find offensive. (The PTA is at the top of the list when it comes to pressuring networks these days.)

The toughest assaults against prime time have come from the anti-violence people. And they have been successful in reducing the amount and the intensity of violence, but at an ironic cost. Networks tend to substitute sit-com and social relevance for violence. So, the conservative and religious groups that have pushed the networks out of action-adventure have moved programming even more in the direction of liberal chic.

The irony doesn't stop there. Liberal critics who have organized to end sexist commercials and sexist stereotyping sometimes help the groups and causes that they most want to inhibit—the fundamentalist Christian world. Richard Levinson, who wrote *"Columbo"* and *The Execution of Private Slovic*, says that the "primary bias of prime-time TV in the last several years has been liberal," but that the liberal trend may generate conservative counterpressures that could one day move the industry out of serious drama and back into cutesy, inoffensive programming. So far, however, that day is nowhere in sight.

The "new" season which started in February and the "new, new" season which started in March show that we've reached a near equilibrium. Gratuitous violence is down, sexy sit-com is up, and liberal chic is pretty much everywhere. ☑



by David W. Moore with Robert E. Craig

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The Countdown Begins

One year before they cast their ballots in the 1980 presidential sweepstakes, voters in the first and probably most decisive primary in the nation appear to hold views that are strikingly similar to those of other voters across the country.

That's one of the major conclusions to emerge from our survey conducted in New Hampshire and commissioned by *Public Opinion* magazine. The survey was taken between February 18th and March 4th through telephone interviews with 602 registered Republicans and 531 registered Democrats randomly selected throughout the state. Theoretically, it is 95 percent certain that the results in the Republican sample differ by no more than five percentage points in either direction and in the Democratic sample by no more than six points from what would have been obtained by interviewing all adult Republicans and Democrats in the state.

New Hampshire is no more a microcosm of the nation than is any other state. But as the survey shows, it is certainly within the mainstream of American politics, so that the preferences and concerns of its citizenry are somewhat representative of the rest of the nation at this early stage of presidential politicking. New Hampshire voters are most concerned about inflation and the energy situation, issues also of importance to the nation as a whole. To Republicans, the third most important issue is "keeping our military and defense forces strong," while Democrats find the cost of health care their third most important concern. Crime and lawlessness, and leadership in government are the next two most important issues for both Democrats and Republicans. Of least concern to Republicans are environmental pollution, U.S. relations with China, and unemployment, while of least concern to Democrats are U.S. relations with China and Soviet military power. Moreover, as every candidate knows, no one has become

president since 1952 without first winning the New Hampshire primary.

Among Democrats, the survey shows that with three men in the race, Senator Ted Kennedy leads President Carter by about two-to-one (48% to 23%), while Carter leads Jerry Brown by about the same margin (23% to 12%). Only one-sixth of the Democratic voters are unsure who their candidate might be. (It is worth noting that the survey was taken before President Carter's triumphant trip to the Middle East), although some early national surveys indicate that the political impact may not have been great. (See Table 1.)

If Kennedy does not run, about 41 percent of his potential vote would switch to Carter while 32 percent would go to Brown with the rest unsure. Thus, without Kennedy, the President enjoys a 43-27 percent lead over Brown, a substantial but not insurmountable mar-

Table 1
WHO DO DEMOCRATS PREFER FOR PRESIDENT?

Three Candidates		Kennedy Not in Race
Carter	23%	43%
Brown	12	27
Kennedy	48	—
Unsure	17	30
	100%	100%

Note: N=527 Democrats.

Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine, February 18-March 4, 1979.

gin against an opponent who has not campaigned in the state. (See Figure 1.)

Among Republicans, it appears as though the close contest of the 1976 primary could be repeated were both Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan to enter. Ford and Reagan are tied with 29 percent each, while Senator Howard Baker is a distant third with only 9 percent. John Connally, George Bush, Philip Crane, and Bob Dole

Figure 1**WHAT HAPPENS TO THE KENNEDY SUPPORTERS IF KENNEDY DOES NOT RUN?**

Supporters go to:	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Overall
Carter	42%	45%	20%	41%
Brown	25%	30%	48%	32%
Unsure	33%	25%	32%	27%

Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine, February 18-March 4, 1979.

are all relatively equal, with at most 5 percent of the vote.

Much can change in a year, of course, and thus to see how much potential support there is for these candidates, we tabulated the percentage of Republicans who named each candidate as either first, second, or third choice. Ford and Reagan were both named among the top three choices of 49 percent of the Republicans, while Baker, Connally, and Dole were named by 20, 17, and 15 percent, respectively. It is clear that Reagan and Ford are the candidates to beat, but should Ford not run, the three most likely challengers to Reagan—at least at this stage—are Baker, Connally, and Dole. So far, perhaps because they still suffer from low name recognition, Bush, Crane, Jack Kemp, and Lowell Weicker have very little public support to build on.


If Ford does not run, 38 percent of his voters said they would go to Reagan, while only 12 percent would jump to Baker and smaller percentages to other candidates. Thus, without Ford in the race, Reagan would enjoy a 40-13 percent lead over Baker, his closest competitor. All of these New Hampshire results are relatively close to early preference polls that George Gallup, Louis Harris, and the *Los Angeles Times* have conducted across the country; the only major differences are that

Kennedy appears to be somewhat stronger and Connally somewhat weaker than in the nation at large. (See Table 2.)

Carter's Performance Ratings

Not surprisingly, President Carter's job ratings are much higher among New Hampshire Democrats than Republicans but relatively low when compared to past presidents. Respondents were asked to "rate the overall job President Carter is doing as President," and 39 percent of the Democrats and only 16 percent of the Republicans expressed approval (responding "excellent" or "pretty good"). The comparable approval for Carter's "handling of foreign policy matters" was 37 percent for Democrats and 19 percent for Republicans, while his "handling of the economy" dropped to 24 percent and 14 percent, respectively.

As Figure 2 shows, there is a definite ideological factor in the way that some voters view the President. On the Republican side, for example, approval ratings

Figure 2**IDEOLOGY AND CARTER'S PERFORMANCE RATINGS**

Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine, February 18-March 4, 1979.

for Carter's handling of foreign policy are 18 points higher among self-described moderates and liberals than among conservatives. On the Democratic side, conservative Democrats give Carter a 31 point approval rating on handling economic policy, compared to a 14 percent rating among liberal Democrats. In fact, conservative Democrats are the most satisfied of any group with Carter's handling of the economy.

On issues, Carter's rating is most *helped* among Republicans by those who are very concerned about environmental pollution, but his rating is most *hurt* by those who are very concerned about the strength of our military and defense forces, the military power of the Soviet Union, and leadership in government. Carter's rating is also damaged substantially by those who believe that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in overall military power. Among Democrats, Carter's

Table 2**WHO DO REPUBLICANS PREFER FOR PRESIDENT?**

	1st Choice	Named as 1st, 2nd or 3rd Choice	Reagan Not in Race	Ford Not in Race
Reagan	29	49	—	40
Ford	29	49	39	—
Baker	9	20	12	13
Connally	5	17	8	8
Dole	4	15	6	6
Bush	2	6	2	3
Crane	2	6	3	3
Kemp	1	4	1	1
Weicker	1	5	2	1
Unsure	18	—	27	25
	100%		100%	100%

Note: N=602 Republicans.

Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine, February 18-March 4, 1979.

rating is *helped* most by those who are very concerned about unemployment, environmental pollution, and the costs of health care. He is most *hurt*, however, by concerns about the strength of U.S. military and defense forces, and by those who believe the United States is behind rather than ahead of or equal to the Soviet Union in overall military power.

These results show not only that Democrats rate Carter more highly than Republicans but that the reasons for the higher ratings apparently lie in the Democrats' concerns about various domestic issues and their assessment that Carter is doing a fairly good job in dealing with those issues. Republicans are not similarly influenced toward Carter by the domestic issues.

On foreign policy issues, however, Republicans and Democrats are negatively influenced by the President's stewardship.¹ The concerns and views expressed about U.S. military power suggest a very potent campaign issue against the President, if not in the primary election then at least in the general election.

The Kennedy Mystique

One of the most serious problems that President Carter faces, certainly in New Hampshire and apparently in other parts of the nation, is how to overcome the popularity of Senator Kennedy among Democrats. The New Hampshire poll shows that even if Carter moderately improves his overall rating, it is unlikely he could draw more support than Kennedy. Table 3 illustrates the problem. Of those who rate Carter's job as excellent, Carter does indeed lead Kennedy 65 to 25 percent. But only 4 percent of the Democrats rate Carter so highly.

Table 3
CARTER'S OVERALL PERFORMANCE RATING
AND DEMOCRATIC PREFERENCES FOR PRESIDENT

Carter Ratings	Democratic Preferences		
	Carter	Brown	Kennedy
Excellent	65%	5%	25%
Pretty Good	39	8	40
Only Fair	15	13	53
Poor	3	19	60

Note: To interpret this table, read the first line as follows: "Of those who rate Carter's performance as excellent, 65% of them prefer him as President in 1980, 5% prefer Brown, and 25% prefer Kennedy." Similarly, of those who rate Carter's performance as pretty good, 39% prefer him in 1980, and so on. In the poll, 4% rated Carter's performance as excellent; 35% as pretty good; 43% as only fair; and 18% as poor.


Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine, February 18-March 4, 1979.

Among the 35 percent who give Carter a "pretty good" rating, Carter can do no better than even with Kennedy. Moreover, among those who rate his job as "only fair," Carter gets less than one-third of the support Kennedy receives and, among Democrats who give him a "poor" rating, he gets almost no support. Thus, to exceed Kennedy's drawing power, Carter must persuade massive numbers of Democrats that he is doing an "excellent"

¹ We did not ask questions about Middle East issues, where Carter's performance may be a positive factor in his overall rating.

Figure 3

IDEOLOGY AND CHOICE FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE



Source: Survey by David Moore and Robert Craig for *Public Opinion* magazine February 18-March 4, 1979.

job—no mean feat with inflation hovering near double digits.

This dominance by Kennedy is even more surprising because it is related neither to specific issues nor to voters' ideological positions. Voters across the partisan spectrum, from liberal to conservative, give Kennedy about the same level of support (Figure 3). This same pattern holds across all issues except national health insurance. On the latter, Kennedy draws 61 percent support from those who favor a national program, and only 43 percent support from those who oppose it. Yet, even among opponents of national health insurance, a program for which Kennedy has campaigned vigorously across the country, he still draws more voters than Carter (43-39 percent).

Kennedy's popularity in New Hampshire must therefore be seen not as a response to selected issues but to his political popularity. This point is underscored by the fact that if Kennedy is not in the race (even as a write-in), a plurality of his liberal and moderate supporters would jump to Carter, but an overwhelming plurality of the conservatives would opt for Brown. The pattern is the same on several other issues, with Brown drawing greater support from the would-be Kennedy supporters who are very concerned about the strength of U.S. military and defense forces, who oppose a health insurance program, who support the balanced budget proposal, who want to increase defense expenditures, and who are very concerned about leadership in government and the energy situation. Carter draws greater support from the would-be Kennedy supporters whose views are just the opposite from those. Thus, between only Brown and Carter, the primary election campaign would revolve largely around ideological and issue differences, with Carter the moderate to liberal and Brown the conservative. With Kennedy in the race, the issues would be overshadowed by the Kennedy personality.

Among Republicans, An Ideological Divide

Unlike the Democratic contest with Kennedy as a candidate, preferences for the two major Republican candidates are strongly associated with issues. Ford's support is much stronger among moderates and liberals, while Reagan captures much of the conservative vote.

Both men, however, enjoy strong overlapping support as well.

On specific issues, Reagan shows strength among those who favor a constitutional convention to balance the budget, a constitutional amendment to limit abortions, and a policy of increasing defense expenditures while limiting other expenditures. Reagan also receives greater support than Ford from those who are very rather than moderately concerned about the power of the Soviet Union and keeping U.S. defense forces strong, and from those who oppose SALT and feel the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military power. Republicans on the other side of these same issues—and the party is rather evenly divided on several of them—throw most of their support behind a potential Ford candidacy. The other Republican candidates have too little support from those surveyed to analyze the nature of their support. Thus, we cannot tell now how much support some of the minor candidates may draw from the two major candidates.

SALT: Opinion Still Volatile

One of the issues explored most deeply in this survey was attitudes toward SALT. For most voters in New Hampshire, it appears the SALT debate has yet to begin. Over 60 percent of Democrats and Republicans are unsure whether they will support or oppose a new strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union. Of those who have formed an opinion, those who favor the treaty outnumber those who oppose it by a two-to-one margin among Republicans, and a four-to-one margin among Democrats. The large number of undecided voters, however, means that the ratios could fluctuate dramatically as the debate for ratification of a new treaty begins in earnest. Moreover, about half of those who expressed a view did so with only moderate intensity, suggesting additional potential for fluctuation.

To explore the firmness of opinions, we asked those who favored the treaty two additional questions: whether they would continue to favor it if the Soviets stood to gain more from it than the United States, or if the Soviets could still move ahead of the United States in overall military power. Of those who opposed the treaty, we also asked two additional but different questions: whether they would continue to oppose the treaty if it meant the United States would spend significantly less on defense, or if it would help to reduce the risk of war. In both cases, the opinions of those who favored or opposed the treaty shifted under the conditions proposed by the subsequent two questions.

The potential for erosion is particularly large among those who now say they support the treaty: over two-thirds said they would shift over into opposition if they were convinced that under the treaty, the Soviets stood to gain more than the United States, or that the Soviets could move ahead of the United States in overall military power. There is also the possibility of ero-

sion among opponents of the treaty should they become convinced that it would allow the United States to spend significantly less on defense or that it would reduce the risk of war. The potential for erosion, however, appears to be considerably less among foes than among current friends of the treaty.

What these figures reveal is that the SALT issue among New Hampshire voters is not at all resolved. Indeed, except for all but a very small fraction of the voters, arguments about the relative advantages and disadvantages of the new SALT treaty may still influence people's views to one position or the other.

To explore the question still further, we used multivariate statistics to determine which of several factors might be most influential on voters' attitudes toward a new SALT treaty. We included voters' views on whether Soviet behavior in Africa and the Middle East should be linked to a Senate vote on SALT, their views on the relative power of the U.S. and U.S.S.R., their level of concern about keeping U.S. military and defense forces strong, their concern about U.S. relations with China, political ideology, concern about Soviet military power, and Carter's rating on his handling of foreign policy matters.

The results show that for Republicans only two factors, when controlled for all others, relate strongly to their attitudes toward SALT: their concern about Soviet military power and their rating of Carter's handling of foreign policy matters. These factors are about equally influential, showing that the greater the concern about Soviet military power and the lower their rating of Carter, the more opposed they are to SALT.

For Democrats, their rating of Carter is by far the most important factor influencing their view of SALT, but ideology, concern about U.S. relations with China, and perceptions about the relative strength of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. all exert independent, though smaller influence. The higher the rating of Carter, the more liberal the voter; the greater the concern about U.S. relations with China, and the more the U.S. is perceived as equal or ahead of the U.S.S.R. in military power, the greater is the likelihood of a Democrat supporting SALT.

The emergence of the Carter ratings as a major influence on people's attitudes on SALT parallels the findings reported in the last issue of *Public Opinion*.² There it was noted that people's trust in the negotiators of the SALT treaty, and by implication their confidence in Carter, was the single major factor influencing SALT attitudes among the general public. This same factor is also important for New Hampshire voters, although—as noted above—additional factors are also at work. Nevertheless, Carter's ability to engender public trust in his foreign policy stewardship will clearly play a crucial role in the public's acceptance or rejection of SALT II. □

² David W. Moore, "SALT: A Matter of Trust," *Public Opinion*, January/February 1979.

SALT OPPONENTS MORE SOLID THAN SUPPORTERS


The New Hampshire poll suggests that there is still enormous public uncertainty about the prospective SALT II treaty. Over 60 percent of all New Hampshire Democrats and Republicans say they have not yet made up their minds.

But even among those who have taken a position, there is great potential for erosion. As the charts on this page show, over two thirds of those who say they now support the treaty would change their minds



and oppose it if they learned that it allowed the Soviets to gain more than the U.S. or to move ahead militarily.

While treaty opponents are now smaller in numbers, their opposition seems more firmly based: about a third would change their minds and favor the treaty if they decided that it would permit the U.S. to spend less on defense or that it reduced the risks of war.

The exact questions asked were: "Do you favor or oppose a new SALT treaty with the Soviet Union, or are you unsure at this time?" If favor: "Would you favor the treaty if the Soviets stood to gain more from it than the United States? Would you favor the treaty if the Soviets could still move ahead of the United States in overall military power?" If oppose: "Would you oppose the treaty if it meant the United States could spend significantly less on defense? Would you oppose the treaty if it would help reduce the risk of war?"



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by Richard Rose

The World's Biggest Free Election

On June 10th of this year, the biggest free election in the world will be held in the nine member nations of the European Community. Up to 200 million people will be eligible to troop to the polls to choose among several thousand candidates for seats in the European Parliament. The new Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will sit for constituencies ranging from Sicily to Sligo and from South Wales to Saxony.

Will this election be merely a footnote in history? Or will it mark a turning point on the road toward a supranational state?

One result is already known: no party can win a majority in the European Parliament because none will contest as many as half the 410 seats there. The fifty-plus parties involved in this first Euro-election are fighting solely on a national basis. The four biggest countries in the Community—Britain, France, Germany, and Italy—will each have eighty-one members. The smaller countries are overrepresented relative to population: the Netherlands has twenty-five, Belgium twenty-four, Denmark sixteen, Ireland fifteen, and tiny Luxembourg, six MEPs.

If all goes well, the winner will be the European Community itself. Proponents of direct elections see the June vote as a necessary and important stage in creating a supranational government, for no government can claim authority in Europe today unless it has the legitimacy derived from direct elections. The campaign is also intended to increase voters' identification with the Community since they will now be able to select their own representatives for the first time.

The making of Europe has, of course, been a long process. Historians of the Community date its start from the crowning of Charlemagne in 800 A.D. At pessimistic moments, federalist advocates of a supranational Community think it may take another 1,179 years to finish the job. A European parliament of sorts has been in existence since September 1952, when a Common Assembly of seventy-eight nominated representatives of the six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community. This became the European Parliament in 1958, after the establishment of a six-nation European Community and was expanded after

three additional countries—Britain, Denmark, and Ireland—joined the Community in 1973.

The Parliament currently meets in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, long the crossroads of the peoples and armies of Europe. Even though its members have not been directly elected, a nine-nation poll sponsored by the Community in 1977 found that the nominated parliamentarians were almost exactly representative of the political wishes of citizens. The members, however, have lacked both clout and political legitimacy, as what power there has been at the supranational level has been exercised by the European Commission, the executive arm of the Community that is based in Brussels and is effectively accountable to the nine member governments.

What the People Think

As a number of public opinion surveys have shown, most Europeans are pro-Europe and believe that the European Community is a good thing. Membership has

Table 1

Question: Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership in the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

	1973		1975		1978	
	Good thing	Bad	Good thing	Bad	Good thing	Bad
Belgium	57%	5%	59%	3%	58%	6%
Denmark	42	30	41	27	34	31
France	61	5	67	4	54	9
Germany	63	4	61	6	58	3
Ireland	56	15	67	12	54	17
Italy	69	2	75	4	65	5
Luxembourg	67	3	78	4	73	5
Netherlands	63	4	67	3	78	5
United Kingdom	31	34	50	24	29	38
The whole Community	56	11	63	9	53	13

Source: Nine national surveys conducted on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, by the following organizations: DiMarso/INRA, Belgium and Luxembourg; Gallup Market-analyse, Denmark; Institut Français d'opinion publique, France; EMNID, Germany; Irish Marketing Surveys, Ireland; Istituto per le Ricerche Statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica (DOXA), Italy; Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie (NIPO), Netherlands; Social Surveys (Gallup Poll), United Kingdom.

been most popular in the Netherlands and least popular in the three countries that joined in 1973. In only two of the nine member nations do less than a majority believe that their country's membership in the Community is a good thing (Denmark, 34 percent; Great Britain, 29 percent). (See Table 1.)

The contrast between pro-European opinion in the original six member nations of the Community and unfavorable views in new members may be explained in two very different ways. Pro-Europeans believe that the British and Danes have not belonged to the Community long enough to appreciate its benefits so that it is simply a matter of time before they change their minds. Critics, especially in Britain where they dominate the governing Labour party, believe that their national traditions and interests are remote from the heart of the continent.

Throughout Europe, 71 percent of the public wish to see a directly elected Parliament, only 11 percent are against. Support for elections comes from across the political spectrum: nearly three-quarters of Communists and Socialists, as well as three-quarters of Conservatives, favor direct elections. Those hesitant to support the idea tend to be people who do not directly identify with any party represented in the current Parliament.

European public opinion favors direct elections as a step toward creating a common psychological identification among a community of people. Nearly three in five of Europeans with views believe that direct elections will not only strengthen the political institutions of the Community, but also strengthen their personal feeling of European citizenship.

Some of that support for a stronger Community

evaporates, however, when Europeans are forced to say whether an elected Member of the European Parliament should vote on national or supranational grounds. Forty-three percent say the new MEPs should vote for the good of Europe as a whole, but exactly the same number want them to "vote their district," that is, vote in the national interest. Supporters of supranational voting are most numerous in the Netherlands, outnumbering Dutch nationalists by a margin of almost two-to-one. At the other extreme, two-thirds of the Irish people want their MEP to vote for Ireland, or more likely, to vote for the interest of their particular constituency, townland or parish. (See Table 2.)

Goodwill also slackens when Europeans are asked point-blank whether they would wish the European Parliament to have the final say on matters now controlled by their own national government. This testing question divides Europeans exactly 50-50, excluding "don't knows." There are big national differences in opposition to supranational Europe. Citizens of the three new member-states—Britain, Ireland, and Denmark—line up more than two-to-one in favor of national governments having the final say on all matters, whereas five of the six original members show a majority ready to give some sovereign powers to the European Parliament.

The chief issue concerning voters in the European election will be the same as in national elections: the economic difficulties currently facing every Western country. One way in which the Community might alleviate these troubles is to redistribute resources among its members. The European Monetary System is meant to do this by giving others the advantage of Germany's success in fighting inflation. Another way is to redistribute revenues. Not surprisingly, two-thirds of British and Irish voters favor such policies, for many of their citizens would qualify as residents of backward or decaying regions needing economic assistance.

Foreign policy questions are likely to be in the background of this election, barring the outbreak of a major international crisis. Only one voter in seven thinks the Community ought to try to strengthen military defenses, and a surprisingly small proportion—22 percent—think it is important for it to gain greater control of multinational companies. A clear majority wish to see the Community develop a foreign policy independent of the United States. This sentiment is highest in France (76 percent) and relatively low in Germany, where 33 percent still favor a foreign policy within the framework of an American alliance, as against 50 percent wishing an independent European foreign policy.

The Campaign and the Results

Psephologists (that is the Greek term for election experts) will have a continental field day when the election results start pouring in this June. Each of the nine nations will be using its own distinctive electoral system. Moreover, the French have adopted a very different

Table 2

Question: Which of the following attitudes would you expect a member from your country in the European Parliament to have?

- (a) He should support things that are good for Europe as a whole even if they are not always good for our country at the time.
- (b) He should support the interests of our country all the time, whether or not they are good for Europe as a whole.

	(a) Support what is good for Europe	(b) Support what is good for nation	Difference (a minus b)
Belgium	37%	43%	— 6%
Denmark	34	50	—16
France	45	41	4
Germany	44	33	11
Ireland	30	65	—35
Italy	44	43	1
Luxembourg	46	48	— 2
Netherlands	60	31	29
United Kingdom	35	57	—22
The whole Community	43	43	0

Source: Nine national surveys conducted on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, May 1978, by the organizations cited in Table 1.

Table 3

Question: How would you vote in a direct election for the European Parliament? (Answers grouped according to pan-European coalitions in the European Parliament, not the names of national parties.)

	Extreme Left	Communist	Socialist	Liberal	Christian Democrat	Euro Progressive Democrat	Conservative	Regional parties	Other
Belgium	—%	2%	25%	13%	47%	—%	—%	10%	2%
Denmark	3	6	41	16	2	6	13	—	13
France	5	11 ^a	40 ^a	16 ^b	3	14 ^c	—	—	11
Germany	—	1	47	8	42	—	—	—	2
Ireland	—	—	14	—	25	58 ^d	—	—	3
Italy	2	22 ^a	24 ^a	7	37	—	—	—	8
Luxembourg	—	2	41	21	35	—	—	—	1
Netherlands	—	1	38	14	30	—	—	—	16
United Kingdom	—	—	46	7	—	—	44	2	1
The whole Community	2	7	38	10	22	4	10	10	6

Notes: ^aIn France and Italy, public opinion polls tend to underestimate Communist support and overestimate Socialist support. The figures for the two party groups are thus best added together and treated as the strength of the broad left; ^bSupporters of President Giscard d'Estaing; ^cGaullist party; ^dFianna Fail party.

Source: Nine national surveys conducted on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, October-November 1978 by the organizations cited in Table 1.

procedure for electing their MEPs (national list proportional representation) than they use for elections to their National Assembly (single-member districts, with a runoff ballot). Because every country but Britain will elect its members by proportional representation, the whole spectrum of political opinion—from Communists to a few neo-Fascists—is likely to be represented in the new Parliament.

At the national level, electors will have little difficulty in translating their views into votes, for the ballot will bear familiar party names. But at the Community level, the result will be a mishmash in all of the Community's official languages because there are no effective cross-national alliances between the parties. (See Table 3.)

Political power may be equally diffused in the new Parliament. The Socialist group is virtually certain to be the largest single cluster represented there, for it is the only group effectively contesting seats in all nine countries, and everywhere except Ireland and Italy, Socialists are one of their country's two strongest parties. But whether the Socialists can weld together a meaningful coalition remains open to doubt. German and British Socialists are at loggerheads because the former favor a stronger Community and the latter do not, and both are in opposition to the French and Italian Socialists, who have been cooperating with Communists in national elections.

French and Italian Communists can between them expect to win several dozen seats in the Parliament, but they will be relatively isolated because of their weakness elsewhere in Europe and because few voters or politicians in other parties wish to join in coalition.

The majority of Members of the European Parliament should be non-Socialist, and many anti-Socialist. Consistently, three in five members of the old nominated Parliament were center or right. Unless European opinion takes an unexpected swing to the left this spring, this balance is likely to continue.

The effectiveness of a center-right coalition is also open to doubt, however. Typically, its unity is based not in positive aspirations, but in negative opposition to socialism. And even this opposition is uneven, as Belgian and Dutch Christian parties have shown a willingness to coalesce with Socialists, as has been done in the not too distant past in France and Italy as well. Christian parties often parade a Socialist alliance as proof that they are a "social" party and not the party of right-wing businessmen. A Socialist-Christian alliance could form a majority bloc in the new European Parliament. But such an alliance would leave out in the cold three major European parties: the British Conservatives, allied only with Danish Conservatives; Ireland's governing Fianna Fail party, allied with the French Gaullists; and Giscard d'Estaing's party, allied with European Liberals.

For the time being, absence of a majority party will not be a great handicap to the new Parliament because it does not have great powers. The European Parliament is not a sovereign legislative body so that it may not pass legislation that will be binding upon its member nations. Nor does it have effective control over the finances of the European Community or upon the decision-making processes of the Community. Power, as we have seen, is centered in Brussels in the Commission.

The most and the least that can be said for the new directly elected European Parliament is that it can claim legitimacy—and that may lead to greater power in the future. The Parliament has a better claim than Cabinet ministers or anonymous civil servants to represent the peoples of Europe. Critics of the Community hope that the new Parliament will use its status to check what they regard as abuses and unwarranted interference by the European Commission in national affairs. Supporters of European unification hope that the Parliament will mobilize public opinion so that it can become a powerful legislature in a powerful supranational Community. ☑

(Johnson—cont. from page 7)

That's why I feel the action of Communist China in Vietnam was a sudden *deus ex machina* coming to the rescue of world stability in the Far East.

Wattenberg: *Just to play a little game, can we make the case that if we move out not to the era of our children but to the era of our grandchildren, that they will be talking Chinese? Could China be a new, dominant force in the twenty-first century?*

Johnson: Looking into the remote future, there is no doubt about it. The Chinese are very able, hard-working people, who are bound to play an enormous role in the world the moment they get themselves efficiently organized.

It now appears that having established a general collectivist framework, the more intelligent among them are trying to establish a certain limited area of individual enterprise within that framework, and this may prove to be quite a successful formula. Once they do hit on a successful formula, things will happen very fast.

But I don't think we'll ever be speaking Chinese. The process whereby English has become a world language is now irreversible, and I don't expect serious competition from the Chinese language, which is, in historic terms, primitive and very difficult to acquire.

Gergen: *You've spoken about the decline of American economic and military influence. How would you assess American cultural influence today, both of the Coca Cola variety and higher culture?*

Johnson: It depends how narrowly you define culture. If you define it rather widely as something which embraces spiritual and general attitudes toward hedonism and so on, I would say that the American culture has, in a curious way, transformed the world, and I would revert to my earlier point that it is a culture of plenty.

The basic assumptions of the American utopia are that the world is a good place; that God has provided us with a superfluity of good things; if only we set about getting them correctly and organize ourselves, there is absolutely no reason at all why everybody shouldn't enjoy, within limits, a pretty

good life. For the first time, that has now been universally accepted by the world as not only an ideal but an attainable ideal. It's the old concept of "a chicken for every pot," first articulated, curiously enough, by Henry IV of France—but the first nation to hold it out for the world as a whole was America, and that is the very essence of American culture, as I see it. To that extent, this has, indeed, been the "American Century."

It is also continuing. Whether they are Iranians or Tanzanians or Chinese, people think that they are in the running for plenty, too, and they're going to make sure that they get it.

Spreading the Word about Capitalism

Wattenberg: *The vision of plenty has survived. The question is whether there is a survival quality to the means toward that plenty.*

Johnson: Yes, that is a big question. In my view, so long as America can continue to demonstrate, by her own example, that entrepreneurial capitalism is not only the best, but in fact, the only way in which that plenty can be secured, then I think the "American Century" can continue.

But in order for that to come about, America has got to administer its own internal economic affairs with considerably more skill and self-conviction than it has been doing in recent years, and, above all, it has to spread the word about capitalism; it must engage in a certain amount of propaganda, saying "If you want plenty—and we take it that you do—this is the way you get it. We've shown you how—we are showing you how."

Once again, it comes back to a lack of self-confidence, I'm afraid. The nucleus of power in the world is physical strength, but all the superstructure is self-confidence—whether you believe in your own slogans and your own ideals. What is wrong with American capitalism, insofar as there is anything wrong with it, is that it doesn't trust itself to deliver the goods. That's why it invokes the powers of the state.

It seems to me that all ideologies stand or fall by the importance they attach to the individual. Individualism, the intrinsic worth of every single human being, is compatible with capitalism but is not compatible with a collectivist economy. That, I think, is the

fundamental strength of capitalism—its nonmaterialistic appeal.

The propaganda has pointed to the dark, satanic mills and the idea of someone being overwhelmed by giant international corporations, and so forth. But the point about capitalism is that it can accommodate the individual, whereas collectivism can't. It is a very important point that those who defend the American way of life don't point to enough.

Prescription for the Future

Wattenberg: *To return to our original question, as you look at the spirit and mood of America, would you say that insofar as there has been a diminishment of the "American century"—to use that phrase—it is not necessarily terminal, that our writ has not yet run?*

Johnson: Yes. I think America is now discovering that it cannot abdicate its role as a world leader, no more than it could in 1945.

At the moment, the American people are going through a period of self-questioning. They're saying, we have gone into a period of decline; the world feels this; we feel it. Now what are we going to do about it? That, in itself, is a sign of continuing life and vitality in America and continuing recognition that America has a special role to play.

I've no doubt at all that America has not only the physical resources, but equally important, the moral resources to reassert its leadership of the world and to pursue that leadership role vigorously. I have no real doubts about the United States. I think there is a hell of a lot going for America, and the spirit is still there.

What we're seeing at the moment is a period of retrospection before a further assertion of American ground rules, in my view. Now that is an optimistic view, and I don't want to be too optimistic because I don't want to encourage Americans to think that the situation is inevitably going to be all right.

I think America has to make a tremendous act of will, and the sooner it makes it, the easier it's going to be. It's going to be difficult in any event. The longer it delays, the more difficult it's going to be. And the more powerful the forces building up against it, the more difficult they will make it.

America has to make this terrific act of will, but I think it can make it, and I think it will make it. ☐

(Boorstin—cont. from page 9)

and saving that individual from paranoia or any other disorder. People will try anything in order to accomplish that adjustment, and so that's the way I would put it. I don't see Freud as a symptom of the American guilt pre-occupation.

But his notion of guilt cannot be separated from the American experience itself. The American situation inevitably bred a sense of why should we be here enjoying all this peace and remoteness from the wars and miseries of Europe? We've left our relatives behind in the ghettos and in the slums. The American situation and the delights and opportunities of Americans themselves were such that among sensitive people, they bred a kind of guilt. And the superiority of the American situation, the higher standard of living, inevitably would make a person feel discomfited by the miseries of others. I don't know whether you want to call that guilt or not, but it's not very far from it.

* * *

Boorstin: In the long run, the ability of the United States to find its way in the world will depend on the extent to which we are able to orient ourselves to the great movements in civilizations of the world.

We've made very little progress in that direction. Most Americans have no understanding of the nature of the civilization of Japan, which is so important to us, not to mention India and China, nor Islam and other religious movements. These are great tasks, and I think that this is really one of the great challenges to American education—to find a way to awaken people to the forces in the world.

Wattenberg: *Paul Johnson has sketched out a scenario that represents a great threat, I think, to the continued existence of what we call "Western Civilization." Do you see a threat to the continued existence of Western civilization? As an historian, do you get a clammy feeling when you pick up your daily newspaper?*

Boorstin: I think we'd be better off if we didn't pick up newspapers as often as we do. I'd rather put it another way. I think all civilizations are always being threatened. And if they are not being threatened, why, they are not worth

building because that suggests that they don't affirm anything; they are not doing anything new. So I don't find anything novel in the fact that a relatively small percentage of the world has free institutions. I don't know whether it's larger now than in the past or not, but certainly it is a very small percentage of the world's population that lives under anything that we would, by any possible stretch of the imagination, call free institutions. To look on that with astonishment is to lack a sense of historical perspective.

The fact that such institutions aren't spreading doesn't mean that they're not good, not by any means. There is a certain naivete, too, in assuming that the test of whether free institutions are good is whether we can persuade others such as the People's Republic of China to accept them. That has nothing to do with the case, as far as I can see.

* * *

Man as Problem Creator

Boorstin: I believe that the great strength of American institutions—and here, I think I would probably disagree with Paul Johnson because I don't believe in absolutes the way he does. But I think the great strength of American civilization has been our power of transformation and our interest in novelty and in the unknown. That resource remains, and every important technology of the United States has been unpredicted, has been unpredictable, and cre-

ates new problems. That's what makes them exciting. I'm thinking of the automobile, the radio, the motion pictures, and television. Nobody wanted them.

While Paul Johnson apparently defines man in a more traditional way as a problem-solving animal and tests the success of our civilization by the extent to which we fulfill his view of man, I would define man as a problem-creating animal. And I find that a more inspiring and more attainable ideal.

That has been the great thing about our country—that is, we have been able to create problems that nobody else could imagine. And each one of those challenges our imagination and invites us to create still more problems. That's what I think it is to be human.

Gergen: *Do the problems grow worse or do they just change their shape?*

Boorstin: They multiply. They get more and more interesting. [Laughter.]

Wattenberg: *You are saying the characteristic of the American century is new problems.*

Boorstin: Yes. Anybody can find solutions, but what is really much more revolutionary is to find new problems. I think that's the fulfillment of man—and, as I see it, the peculiarly human and American thing about our civilization. □



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
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